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This thesis analyses the strategy of modern Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military 
relations in three areas: Defense Relations; Military Relations; and Civil-Military 
Relations.  These relations are assessed in terms of their adequacy to obtain Ukraine’s 
overall strategic goals.  The quantity and complexity of the U.S. defense and military 
engagement programs towards Ukraine have made the entire coordination process 
fragmented.  The thesis concludes that the recent goals and objectives of existing 
relations should be concentrated on the Ukrainian Armed Forces transition to democratic 
civil-military relations. The transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces is essential to 
maintaining progress toward the development of stable and democratic civil-military 
relations in Ukraine and its armed forces that are prepared to assume their place within 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and the United 
States on 03 January 1992, interactions between the two nations have been marked by 
controversy.  Partly because of the “Cold War” echo and the rivalry of two major 
political systems, the United States consistently pressured Ukraine in 1993 for unilateral 
nuclear disarmament.  However, strong centrifugal processes in the countries of the 
former Soviet Union, coupled with Ukraine’s desire for independence, convinced 
Washington that this policy had poor prospects.  Since then, U.S. foreign policy has been 
transformed into a more flexible democratic partnership between the two nations.  On 
November 22, 1994, the Charter for Ukrainian-American Partnership, Friendship and 
Cooperation1 highlighted the beginning of bilateral relations in the political, economical 
and military spheres.  According to George W. Bush Administration, U.S. – Ukraine 
relations are a strategic priority, and the Unites States supports Ukraine’s democratic 
transition and its internal reforms.   
These events led to the establishment of an important component of U.S. – 
Ukraine relations, the Memorandum Concerning the Mutual Understanding and 
Cooperation in the Area of Defense and Military Relations Between Department of 
Defense of the United States of America and Ministry of Defense of Ukraine2 concluded 
on July 27, 1993, even before the key relations began.  Since then, military relations have 
become an active forum for exchanges between the two nations.  Ukrainian – American 
cooperation in defense affairs is based on annual cooperation plans and military contact 
programs concluded between the United States Department of Defense, the United States 
European Command, the Ukrainian General Staff and the Ministry of Defense of 
Ukraine.  
                                                 
1 Embassy of Ukraine to the U.S., Ukraine - U.S. Relations, available [on-line]: 
http://www.ukraineinfo.us/politics/bilatrelations.html; accessed 11 February 2003. 
2 Embassy of Ukraine to the U.S., Ukraine - U.S. Relations, available [on-line]: 
http://www.ukraineinfo.us/politics/bilatrelations.html; accessed 11 February 2003. 
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The thesis emphasizes that Ukrainian – U.S. military relations emerged as one of 
the first areas of bilateral relations.  These relations have not fully corresponded to 
Ukrainian national strategy and the main direction of its foreign policy.  Since the 
consequences of these relations appeared to be conflicting for both countries, mainly 
because of the situation, the outcome is resulting in mounting tension between Ukraine 
and the U.S. military establishments.  Dissatisfaction with the outcomes of such military 
cooperation has appeared in the mass media of both Ukraine and the United States, and 
stresses the inefficient methods of implementing the main elements of cooperation, such 
as educational programs, peacetime engagements and coordination activities.  Such 
dissatisfaction may be discerned by adjusting the recent needs of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces during its reform of and transition to democratic civil-military relations, as one of 
the main elements of the goals and objectives of defense cooperation.  The hypothesis of 
the thesis is that Ukraine – U.S. defense relations should foster the reform process of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces and transformation to democratic civilian-military relations.  
The contribution of democratic civil-military relations in the Ukrainian Armed Forces 
should benefit both Ukraine seeking future NATO membership and the United States, 
which considers such contribution as a guaranty of its future security, especially after the 
events of September 11, 2001.  This effect may be achieved by:  
• Adjusting the goals and objectives of recent cooperation in the defense 
sphere to a democratic structure of civil-military relations in the Armed 
Forces and its place within European and Transatlantic Security 
• Directing the main existing methods (U.S.-Ukraine Joint Staff Talks, U.S.-
Ukraine Bilateral Working Group) of bilateral relations in defense to 
renewed goals and objectives 
• Revising the mechanisms and management of agencies that exist in the 
sphere of military cooperation between Ukraine and the U.S. with the goal 
to perform mutual efforts and prevent deviations from the path to 
democratic military reforms and the transition process in the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces. 
From the aforementioned effects, the goals of this thesis are: 
• To make an objective evaluation of the recent strategy of Ukraine – U.S. 
relations in defense affairs 
• To find its cohesion with the political-military situation in both countries, 
with an emphasis on Ukraine 
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• To trace whether Ukraine and U.S. national security interests and the main 
directions of their respective foreign policies adequately reflect the current 
level of bilateral relations 
• To examine the possible future implications of bilateral relations, 
particularly regarding the reform of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and their 
transition to democratic civil-military relations 
This thesis formulates the lessons learned from an analysis of relations in the 
defense arena between Ukraine and the U.S.  The research for thesis is based on current 
defense and military affairs.  The terms “military cooperation”, “military relations”, 
“relations in the defense area” include: Ukrainian – American political-military, military 
relations and relations in the area of the military science and technology.  The thesis 
employs the terms “relations”, “cooperation” and “strategy”, which have different 
connotations respective to the level of bilateral relations.   
The thesis emphasizes this connection using various published sources published 
in Ukrainian, American and international mass media.  The thesis does not describe the 
question of Ukraine – NATO relations but does address some points of Ukraine – U.S. – 
NATO concern, especially after Ukraine’s announcement of the decision to join NATO.  
Ukraine – U.S. military relations are presented thematically rather then chronologically.  
Chapter II covers the question of the approaches of Ukraine and the United States 
to goals and objectives relative to their military relations and illustrates the development 
of their respective positions.  A short time frame is evaluated to understand the main 
elements that shaped Ukraine – U.S. relations.  The chapter also evaluates the main 
question: “What is served as a starting point for Ukraine and the United States to consider 
such relations as ‘strategic’”?  
Chapter III analyses this strategic partnership using political-military, military and 
technical-military approaches.  The chapter also analyzes and assesses 
• Ukrainian – American Bilateral Working Group annual meetings that are 
the main element of analysis, assessment, estimation and implementation 
of new ideas for Ukrainian – American political-military, military and 
technical-military cooperation 
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• Ukraine – U.S. Joint Staff Talks with the goal of evaluating new issues 
concerning military cooperation and military policy, and the assessment of 
the existing military-political environment 
• The Joint Defense Assessment Program (JDA) as the first attempt to 
evaluate the ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to join the North-
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
• The Plan of Military Cooperation Between the United States Department 
of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine as the main 
document, which defines the basic direction of U.S. – Ukraine military 
relations 
• Ukrainian – American Military-to-Military Contact Programs as the 
main operational document that provides the main direction for bilateral 
relations.3  
Chapter IV emphasizes the development of Ukraine – U.S. defense and military 
relations regarding the transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  This chapter does 
not try to highlight all the aspects of transformation but only those of mutual interest to 
both countries, such as civil-military relations.  
Chapter V makes suggestions about the possible future development of Ukrainian 






                                                 
3 The information about the main outcomes of these mechanisms is provided courtesy of the 
Department of International Cooperation Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.  
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II. UKRAINE AND THE U.S.: BASIC APPROACHES TO THE 
GOALS OF THEIR DEFENSE AND MILITARY RELATIONS 
A. DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S. POSITION 
…Keeping focused on long terms objectives and not allowing every twist 
and turn of Ukrainian domestic politics to drive U.S. policy is crucial.4 
U.S. security, defense and military strategies have are of strategic importance for 
Europe.  With different mechanisms for performing those strategies, Europe will 
obviously remain a major factor of United States national interests abroad.  Bearing this 
fact in mind, President Bush’s advisors provide a European perspective on global 
alliances: 
The slow emergence of Europe as a power in its own right is a fact that 
you will have to accept.  Look on benignly and Europe will be more likely 
to develop in ways that suit the United States.  Although the transatlantic 
relationship will become less unbalanced, the United States will remain 
the senior partner, at least in foreign and defense policy.  The development 
of the EU, the evolution of other regional groups… will in a long run, 
make it harder for the United States to influence events through 
bilateralism or unilateralism.  Working within a multinational framework, 
however cumbersome it may be at times, will serve the U.S. national 
interest.  You need to explain it to American people.5  
These words came shortly before the events of September 11, 2001.  After that 
tragedy, the U.S.’s security, defense and military positions towards Ukraine as a newly 
independent state (NIS) in Eastern Europe have made a visible impact by scrutinizing the 
necessity of bilateral relations to battle terrorism.  Although the U.S.’s security concerns 
in Ukraine were always important, they have soared in the way of assuring that a stable 
and democratic country is a guaranty for U.S. domestic and international security.   
Using timeframes, the U.S. defense and military approach toward Ukraine may be 
characterized by three major periods: the period of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament, the 
                                                 
4 Carlos Pascual, Steven Pifer., “Ukraine’s Bid for a Decisive Place in History,” The Washington 
Quarterly, 25:1 pp. 175-192, Winter 2002. 
5 Charles Grant, A European Perspective on Global Alliances, American Military Strategy, Memos to 
a President, W.W. Norton & Company.: New York, London, 2001. 
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period of bilateral military relations intensification and the period of the reevaluation 
of military relations priorities.  
The first period is characterized by the close interrelation of political, security and 
military components in bilateral relations.  The reason for such behavior from the U.S. 
side is obvious – American political and military circles dread a nuclear deterioration of 
the newly independent states, where there were serious questions surrounding the 
inheritance and control of nuclear weapons during the first years of independence. 
For the United States, the nuclear issue had global and regional, as well as 
bilateral significance… there was also a geo-strategic concern on the part 
of the United States. With so many weapons scattered throughout the four 
former republics, it was feared that they could become an easy target for 
acquisition by terrorists.  After a November 1992 visit to Ukraine, 
Senators Nunn and Lugar cogently reported that while the threat on the 
United States was at an all time low, the threat of unauthorized launch or 
nuclear accident has increased.6    
When the Clinton administration came to power in 1992, the United States 
foreign policy toward Ukraine was amended strictly to marginalize the priority of the 
nuclear question in the bilateral military relations of both countries.  The barrage of 
Clinton’s intense international initiatives resulted in the active development of all aspects 
of security, defense and military cooperation with Ukraine.  Clinton’s National Security 
Strategy for a New Century claimed European security as a vital element to the U.S.’s 
own security: 
European Stability is vital to our own security.  The United States has two 
strategic goals in Europe.  The first is to build a Europe that is fully 
integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace – a realization of the 
vision the United States launched 50 years ago with the Marshall Plan and 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).  Our second goal is to 
work with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global 
challenges no nation can meet alone… 
There is no historical precedent for the transition underway in Russia, 
Ukraine and other NIS… 
                                                 
6 Popaduik Roman, American - Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, McNair Paper, Washington D.C.: 
National Defense University, 1996. 
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The United States strategy of engagement with each of the NIS recognizes 
that their transformation will be a long-term endeavor, with far reaching 
implications for the regional and global stability, as well as 
disappointments and setbacks along the way…  It is in our national 
interest to help them build the laws, institutions and skills needed for a 
market democracy, to fight crime and corruption and to advance human 
rights and the rule of law… 
The United States strategy in Russia and the NIS has made every 
American safer…  The integration of Russia, Ukraine and other NIS with 
the new Europe and the international community remains a key priority…  
The United States remains committed to further development of the 
NATO-Russia relationship and the NATO-Ukraine distinctive 
partnership.7   
That U.S. position by all accounts played a decisive role in shaping Ukraine’s 
military approach to the West.  From the memorandum, which defines the legal 
framework of Ukrainian – U.S. relations in the sphere of security and defense, to a 
variety of bilateral agreements in almost all areas of defense, to fundamental agreements, 
such as Ukrainian participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) activities and the 
Ukrainian-NATO 1997 Charter, Clinton’s era has defined and established the basis for 
the relationship of these two countries in the realm of world security.    
The change of political leadership is always somehow connected with a change in 
a country’s foreign policy approach that is subsequently followed by changes in defense 
policy.  The events of September 11, 2001 have added a harsh political rationality to U.S. 
actions abroad.  U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Ramsfeld has redefined in his 2001 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) New Administration defense policy priorities 
abroad: 
To sustain a strong coalition effort against terrorism, the United States 
needs to remain committed to the security of its friends and allies; to deny 
terrorist safe heavens in countries besides Afghanistan, it has even more 
reason to retain some form of a front warfighting capability;… to sustain 
its values it must continue support …[for] other democracies; to keep its 
economy strong, it must continue to undergird global stability and 
commerce with its military forces… Dropping the 1997 ODR’s strategic 
pillars of ‘shape, prepare and respond’ (where the concept of shaping 
                                                 
7 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, The White House, pp. 29-32, December 1999.  
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refers in part to the need to work with neutral countries) and the broader 
Clinton Administration notion of engagement, it divides the world clearly 
into those who are with us and those who are against.  More specifically 
and normally, it lays out four goals for defense policy: to reassure allies, 
and dissuade, deter, or if necessary defeat the enemies.8   
That rationality scrutinized security concerns regarding U.S. security, defense and 
military strategic approaches towards Ukraine.  The War on Terrorism requires 
substantial financial expenditures.  For this reason, the U.S.’s approach towards 
Ukraine’s military takes on greater importance.  Having financed the majority of its 
military engagements, the United States wants outcomes that are more positive in 
Ukraine’s security approach to the West.  Partial criticism and disappointment in some 
Ukrainian military reform and transformation achievements have appeared in U.S. mass 
media calling for closer scrutiny of its defense policy toward Ukraine.  
Responsibility for the overall engagement strategy toward Ukraine 
remains fragmented.  All actions are supposed to complement the Mission 
Performance Plan (MPP), approved by the ambassador for all federal 
agencies operating under the umbrella of the country team in Kiev, but 
MPP, NATO activity, and the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) 
Military contacts program all exist without one muster…  
What is needed now is less lecturing, greater U.S. humility, more 
thoughtful organizing, rewarding positive change, and discouraging 
inappropriate action.  Because problems cut across the entire government, 
neither OSD nor EUCOM can solve them alone.9        
U.S. initiatives have tangibly concentrated on the question of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces Defense reforms, specifically their conformity to NATO standards and 
progress towards future membership in NATO.  Clinton’s era of a more institutional and 
tolerant period of bilateral defense and the intensification of military relations was 
followed by Bush’s more rational and structurally realistic period of a reevaluation of the 
priorities of military relations. 
                                                 
8 Michael E. O’Hanlon, Defense Policy Choices for the Bush Administration 2001-05, The Brookings 
Institution, White Plains, Maryland, 2002.   
9 Timothy C. Shea, “U.S. – Ukraine Relations. Shaping on NATO Doorstep,” Joint Force Quarterly, 
Autumn-Winter 2001-2002.   
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The U.S. security and defense policy originates from the executive and legislative 
branches of the government, as well as the mass media and non-governmental 
organizations.  The U.S. Department of Defense is the main executive mechanism that 
implements U.S. national security and protects its national interests by deterring and 
defeating threats using military power.  There are four main executive bodies in the case 
of Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military affairs: 
• The Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (NATO and Europe), 
the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security 
Policy) at the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)10 
• Strategic Plans and Policy Department J-5, the Joint Chiefs of Staff11 
• United States European Command, Plans and Policy Directorate (ECJ5), 
Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP)12 
• Defense Attaché Office, United States Embassy in Ukraine 
U.S. engagement with Ukraine is generally concentrated on:  
• Preserving Ukrainian independence and sovereignty 
• Fulfilling its legitimate security needs  
• Playing a constructive role in Ukrainian political, military and economic 
stability 
Security questions are focused on: 
• Helping Ukraine restructure its forces to make them increasingly 
interoperable with NATO 
• Reforms of the Ukrainian defense establishment 
• Institutionalization  
• Practice of civilian control over the military 
• Openness in the military establishment 13 
 
                                                 
10 Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), available [online]: 
http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/orgchart.html; accessed 04 October 2002. 
11 The Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-5), available [online]: http://www.dtic.mil/jcs/; accessed 04 October 
2002. 
12 United States European Command, Joint Contact Team Program (JCTP), available [online]: 
http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECJ5/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECJ5/main.htm&
2; accessed 04 October 2002. 
13 Strengthening Transatlantic Security. U.S. Strategy for the 21st Century, available [online]: 
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Table 1.   Main U.S. Agencies and Organizations Involved with Security, Defense 
and Military Engagement with Ukraine. 
 
The practical implication of the U.S. defense policy through the execution of its 
political-military interagency relations has always been awkward in defining and 
coordinating its defense engagement towards Ukraine.  Several departments, such as the 
Department of State and Department of Defense, coordinated the existing variety of 
military and civilian programs directed towards the Ukrainian military.  These agencies 
sometimes find it difficult to receive the appropriate feedback that would allow them to 
take the necessary coordinative actions.  U.S. military cooperation mechanisms toward 
Ukraine also have coordination problems within the Department of Defense: 
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The Unified Command Plan (UCP)… induced a problem into U.S. – 
Ukraine military relations in that no regional CINC [Commander-in-
Chief] was assigned responsibility for Ukraine…  But in the U.S. military 
system, CJCS [Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staffs] does not have direct 
command authority…  Therefore, although the CJCS is powerful, unlike 
the regional CINCs he has at his disposal few immediate resources to 
execute military contact programs, and cannot simply order the CINCs to 
assist.  This complicated my ability to construct and execute the plan.  
Nearly every military matter concerning Ukraine amounted to a sort of 
‘crisis’, as it could not be handled in normally-used and understood 
channels.14      
The question of the U.S. security and military approach towards Ukraine has 
always been controversial not only for politicians, but also for American political security 
science scholars.  The two schools of thought presented by Zbigniev Brzezinski and 
Samuel Huntington reflect different views of U.S. and Western European security policy 
towards Ukraine based on strategic and cultural arguments respectively.  When 
Brzezinski argues for closer security and strategic cooperation with Ukraine, Huntington 
erects an insurmountable wall of cultural and civilization differences between the West 
and Ukraine. 
Brzezinski is a great supporter of the West’s strategic engagement with 
Ukraine as an independent state… argues that the stability along NATO’s 
new front line, which now lies on Poland’s eastern border, depends largely 
on consolidation of Ukraine’s nation and statehood, success in economic 
reforms and its ability to balance closer cooperation with NATO and the 
EU and economic and political relations with Russia… 
A different way of thinking on Ukraine has since been advanced by 
Samuel Huntington…  The relationships between ‘the West and the rest’ 
will be the most important factor in global security because the West will 
continue to impose its values on other structures…  Ukraine cannot join 
NATO or the EU because it straddles the ‘great power divide’ of 
civilizations, being therefore unable to play the central role in the stability 
and security of Central Eurasia that is often ascribed to it.15  
                                                 
14 Simmeth Harry. U.S.-Ukraine Military Cooperation. National Security and Defense. #12, 2000. 
Available [online]: http://www.uceps.com.ua/eng/all/journal/2000_12/html/75.shtml; accessed 12 
December 2002. 
15 Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Ukraine’s Foreign Policy on Europe’s Periphery: Globalization, 
Transnationalism, and the Frontier, Jennifer D. P. Morroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov. 
Ukrainian Foreign and Security Policy. Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, Praeger Publishers, 
2002.   
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Henceforth, U.S. security and defense policy toward Ukraine depends 
tremendously on the economic, political and security conditions of the United States.  
The War on Terrorism has entailed the development of the National Security Strategy of 
the United States of America.  Clinton’s international institutions approach has been 
changed by Bush’s realist dimension.  
Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military 
strength and great economic and political influence…  We seek… to 
create a balance of power that favors human freedom…  
It is time to reaffirm the essential role of American military strength.  We 
must build and maintain our defenses beyond challenge.  Our military’s 
highest priority is to defend the United States.  To do so effectively, our 
military must:   
• Assure our allies and friends; 
• Dissuade future military competition; 
• Deter threats against U.S. interests, allies, and friends; and 
• Decisively defeat any adversary if deterrence fails.16 
While the national military strategy remains the strategy produced under the 
Clinton administration, some of the new defense policy initiatives are a bit disturbing in 
the manner U.S. Department of Defense engagement toward Ukraine is maintained: 
• A shift in geographic emphasis toward Asia generally, and, within this, a 
dramatic expansion of military presence and engagement in central and 
south Asia 
• A reorientation of America's presence in Europe: although U.S. forces will 
remain in Europe in large numbers, these will serve a mainly political 
function there -- substantiating U.S. leadership of NATO -- while being 
made more available for actual operational use outside Europe 
• With regard to alliance policy, an increased willingness to undertake 
military operations on a unilateral basis and increased reliance on short-
term, ad hoc, or “tactical” coalitions and partnerships 
• A broader and more flexible practice of military assistance to other 
states17 
                                                 
16 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, p. 29, September 
2002. 
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On the other hand, even now, when experiencing the worst deterioration of 
bilateral relations with Ukraine at a high level, the U.S. Department of Defense feels free 
to determine security questions directly with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.  The 
recent 2002 Ukrainian Minister of Defense visit to the U.S. shows the high level of U.S. 
security interests towards Ukraine. 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE UKRAINIAN POSITION 
To the big extent, Ukraine’s future will depend on its relations 
development with U.S. Despite of both sides assertion about their strategic 
partnership, current relations between our countries are undefined…  The 
level and intensity of Ukraine’s cooperation with U.S… is an integral 
indicator of presence (or absence) of political will in Ukraine to continue 
the course on European integration, economic and political reforms, 
democratic norms and principles.18     
The development of a Ukrainian security and defense policy toward the U.S. may 
serve as a good example of Ukraine’s pitfalls and progress on its way to a Western 
European security organization.  According to Ukrainian foreign policy, the main 
direction of the country claims its place within the transatlantic security organization.  At 
the same time, some other official documents discuss its out-of-military-blocks status.  
One way or another, the direction of Ukraine’s foreign policy provides positive 
incentives toward its western aspirations.  For Ukrainian politics, as well as its security 
policy, close cooperation with the United States has always been associated with 
Ukraine’s affiliation with western European institutions.  Subsequently, the deterioration 
of Ukraine’s relations with the U.S. resulted in the slowdown of relations with a majority 
of western European countries.     
The main requirement to employ Ukrainian foreign policy is to fully and 
effectively provide the country’s national interests… Strategic and geo-
political interests, which connected with Ukrainian national security 
providing and defending its political independence…  To provide stability 
of Ukraine’s international position.  To keep country’s territorial integrity 
                                                 
17 Carl Conetta, The Pentagon's New Budget, New Strategy, and New War, Project on Defense 
Alternatives Briefing Report #12, 25 June 2002, PDA Project on Defense Alternatives. Available [on-line]: 
http://www.comw.org/pda/0206newwar.html; accessed 02 February 2003. 
18 Oleg Bilous, “The position of ‘Batkivshina’ political fraction in Ukraine Supreme Council as to 
Ukraine’s strategic partnership,” National Security and Defense, v. 12, 2000, available [online]: 
http://www.uceps.com.ua/eng/all/journal/2000_12/html/75.shtml; accessed 11 November 2002.  
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and inviolability of its borders…Ukraine takes principle of international 
peace integrity and considers that the threat to any country national 
security is the threat to world’s peace and general security.  In its foreign 
policy Ukraine provides such approach as ‘security to itself through 
security to all’… Special meaning for Ukraine is its relations with the 
United States of America as a country, which policy significantly 
influences on international event development…  Ukraine comes forward 
with the idea of creation comprehensive international system of universal 
and whole-European security and considers its membership in such 
organizations as a basic component of its national security.19 
One weakness of Ukraine when compared in the context of the U.S. concerning 
political documents is that U.S. foreign policy and national security papers are updated 
almost every year.  The U.S. is thus able to successfully adjust its foreign and security 
policy toward the world’s recent security environment.  From the very beginning, the 
Ukrainian foreign and security policy has failed to do so, and thus presented an ambiguity 
and vagueness in the course of shaping its climate with the U.S.  To consider such a 
situation as a purely Ukrainian mistake would be wrong.  It is more obvious to state that 
it serves as a typical chain of circumstances that shaped the development of Ukraine as an 
independent state.  In contradistinction to the U.S., the development of Ukraine’s position 
in security and defense areas may be presented in two close but still distinct periods: 
shaping Ukrainian security and defense policy toward the U.S., 1992-2002; and the 
security and defense cooperation with the U.S. through the prism of Ukraine’s future 
membership in NATO.     
Since Ukrainian independence, military institutions were built from scratch.  
Western aspirations dominated Ukrainian military circles when dealing with instability 
during the first days of the creation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  As the first 
Ukrainian Minister of Defense K. Morozov recalls: 
The Ukrainian Armed Forces from the first days of its existence has been 
faced with economic crisis – the limitation of its budget that has 
influenced materiel, the integration of military-civil relations…  The 
Ukrainian Armed Forces today has great authority in Europe and in the 
world.  It cooperates with many governments and armies in Europe, the 
                                                 
19 About Ukraine’s Main Directions of Foreign Policy, Ukrainian Supreme Council Resolution, v. 
3360-XII, 2 July 1993.  
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U.S., and Canada.  Ukraine is special partner with NATO as a 
fundamental element of European security…  Ukraine, as a contributor of 
European stability and security, has achieved this position due to the 
stability and authority of its armed forces.20  
Given the freedom to determine its foreign policy, structurally Ukraine chose the 
traditional concept of executive power distribution on security and defense issues within 
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Table 2.   Main Ukrainian Agencies Responsible for Security, Defense and Military 
Relations with the U.S. 
                                                 
20 Konstiantyn P. Morozov, Above and Beyond. From Soviet General to Ukrainian State Builder, 
Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University, Harvard University Press, 2000.  
21 Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, official Web-site, (English – old version; new version – in 
Ukrainian). Available [on-line]: http://www.comw.org/pda/0206newwar.html; accessed 27 February 2003. 
 15
The presented structure demonstrates the adequate potential of executive elements 
to effectively react to producing, evaluating and adjusting the entire realm of bilateral 
relations. However, in reality, its practical and functional correspondence still lacks 
desirable results.  In the area of the practical application of Ukrainian – U.S. relations, the 
amount of uncertainty considerably shaped the initial Ukrainian position on security 
issues toward the U.S. despite the Ukrainian claim of the nature of its strategic 
partnership.  
The close international relations between the West European states 
conducted according to high standards bring about a situation of coercion 
development in which an unstructured society and an inefficient state feel 
themselves uncertain and not at home.  In Ukraine, this preserve anti-
Western attitudes both among a portion of the elite and population at 
large, and in exaggerating the importance of its own political and 
diplomatic efforts and ability of the agreements concluded to change our 
actual position on international arena.22  
The end of the first period has shown a gradual retreat from the uncertainty of the 
Ukrainian position to join NATO and its lack of understanding of the majority of Western 
perceptions.  According to the polls conducted by the Ukrainian Center of Economic and 
Political Studies in 2000, about 66% of the Ukrainian population and experts consider 
Ukrainian – American cooperation as strategic, and is second after cooperation with 
Russia.  Moreover, security and defense cooperation is second and third respectively in 
the polls after economic cooperation according to the population and experts .23  
The events of September 11th have accelerated Ukraine and U.S. security and 
defense needs in the creation of a global antiterrorist alliance.  In response to these 
events, the logical continuation of Ukrainian participation in the Partnership for Peace 
program resulted in the Ukrainian declaration for NATO’s future membership.   
                                                 
22 Oleksandr Dergachov, “Determinants and illusions of Strategic Partnership,” National Security and 
Defense, v. 12, 2000, available [online]: http://www.uceps.com.ua/eng/all/journal/2000_12/html/75.shtml; 
accessed 11 November 2002.  
23 Ukraine’s Strategic Partnership with other States. Approaches and Estimations. National Security 
and Defense, v. 12, 2000, available [online]: 
http://www.uceps.com.ua/eng/all/journal/2000_12/html/75.shtml; accessed 11 November 2002.  
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This thesis also argues that Ukraine’s recent aspirations toward NATO can 
positively change the Ukrainian military establishment to a more sober estimation of 
goals and objectives of its military cooperation with the U.S.  Concentrating its main 
efforts on the development of true democratic civil-military relations devoid of false 
estimates and context will significantly help the process of the reformation of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces.  The strategy of Ukrainian - U.S. military relations should be 
directed toward the realistic fulfillment of the role and place of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces within the transatlantic security organization.  
It is necessary to know and understand the following.  Political relations in 
Ukraine dominate the general climate of the entire spectrum of relations. However, 
relations in the security and defense arenas seemed to be quite independent during their 
existence.  The reason for such behavior may lie in the mutual security interests of both 
countries in Europe.  Relations between Ukraine and the United States in the security and 
defense sphere more obviously will continue to be quite independent of the path followed 
for NATO relations.  Such paths may be explained by the willingness of the U.S. to have 
European security guarantees other than NATO’s, and Ukraine’s recognition of that 
specific security need.  The Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs, A. Zlenko, 
emphasized the character of such relations: 
It is well known that Ukraine and the Unites States are presented in 
different weight-categories; however they have mutual interests as 
partners.  That interest has a strategic nature.  And I do not think that 
existing problems, whatever difficulty they are, dominate over strategic 
considerations.24   
U.S. and Ukrainian strategic considerations were recently more explicitly 
reflected in their defense and military relations.  To review and analyze such relations 
would significantly contribute to the strategy of the two country’s current defense and 
military relations and would make it possible to provide more information concerning 
possible future development.  
                                                 
24 Ukrainian Minister of Foreign Affairs answers to questions of Korrespondent.Net Internet edition, 
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III. POLITICAL-MILITARY AND MILITARY RELATIONS 
A. DEFENSE COOPERATION 
The main goal of politico-military relations is to maintain the national security 
policies of two countries in the international arena, and more specifically, in the Eastern 
European region.  In geopolitical and strategic ways, Ukraine has found itself at a 
crossroads for European and Asian economic and security considerations.  As a result, 
Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military cooperation has become one of the first areas of 
bilateral relations between the two countries.  
This chapter analyses the state of affairs in Ukrainian – U.S. politico-military 
relations by investigating the structural and functional positions.  The area of politico-
military relations is intertwined in a complex way with pure military and technical-
military relations.  However, the given analysis tries to separate defense and military 
relations in order to thoroughly investigate their outcomes.  As foreign relations are 
divided into economic, political and cultural areas, relations in the defense and military 
sphere can also be divided into its structural components.  The analysis of such 
components will be able to demonstrate the strong and weak sides of Ukrainian – U.S. 
defense and military relations as well as possible ways to further their development.  
Ukraine’s modern strategic initiatives are directed towards future NATO 
membership.  This question has become dominant since Ukrainian National Security and 
Defense Council made an appropriate decision in May 2002. 
Commenting on Ukraine's decision, the NSDC [National Security and 
Defense Council] Secretary, Yevhen Marchuk, said it would be 
‘purposeless and even harmful’ if the country further kept its status as a 
neutral country.  
‘The [NSDC] council agreed that a long-term strategy must be worked out 
that would enable Ukraine to join the collective security system upon 
which NATO is based.’25 
                                                 
25 BBC News World Edition, Ukraine Declares Plans to Join NATO, available [on-line]: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2005036.stm; accessed 23 February 2003.  
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Even before Ukraine’s aspiration to join NATO, Ukrainian – U.S. military 
relations was marked as strategic according to the estimation of Ukrainian and American 
political leaders.  Moreover, when Ukrainian aspirations for Euro Atlantic security 
institution membership are foremost, the defense and military relations of the countries 
do not show a tendency to decline for the sake of the former.  The terms relations, 
cooperation and strategic cooperation are used as the determinants in defining a current 
state of Ukrainian – U.S. military affairs in mass media, political and official 
declarations.  These terms will be further used in the thesis to stress the level of 
importance of bilateral involvement in the defense and military affairs of two countries.  
When the term relations is familiar, the terms cooperation and strategic cooperation 
imply that the special legal and practical base supported by official documents and an 
intensity of bilateral events in the security area exists.  The U.S.’s security interests in 
Europe are not only limited to its participation in NATO, which mostly explains the U.S. 
military and security behavior toward Ukraine.  Klaus Nauman explicitly defines U.S. 
strategic interests in Europe: 
First, the American military presence in Europe means true forward 
defense of the United States and ensures the vital control of the sea lines 
of communications.  Second, the American presence strengthens a unique 
alliance, NATO, which is after all, the only alliance in which all nations 
share the same values.  Third, such a presence enhances American 
strategic flexibility, serving to extend U.S. global reach.  And fourth, the 
American presence in Europe ties together the two most potent economic 
areas.  This link will lead over time to increased cooperation and reduction 
of competition.  The result could be an economic global dominance that 
no one could challenge.  An American presence on the continent best 
serves U.S. strategic interests and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future.26           
Therefore, U.S. security and military policy toward Ukraine is the result of well-
balanced political, economical and military considerations.  At the same time, the 
Ukrainian position is less balanced because the country lacks general state expertise that 
subsequently reflects Ukrainian needs in defense and military relations with the U.S.  As 
                                                 
26 The Future of the American Military Presence in Europe, Editor: Lloyd J. Matthews, U.S. Army 
War College, Strategic Studies Institute, May 2000, available [online]: http://carlise-
www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.html; accessed 22 October 2002.   
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a result, it was not a secret that the U.S. logically dominated either strategically or 
financially in bilateral defense and military cooperation during the last decade.  These 
processes are still underway, and to characterize them negatively, by blaming only 
Ukraine for its inefficiency in conducting well-determined strategy of its defense and 
military relations with the U.S., will be too premature.  Although, the U.S. acted less 
vaguely, the discrepancy between U.S. military and civilian executive bodies in shaping 
U.S. military engagement toward Ukraine proved to not be consequent all the time.  
Despite these difficulties, Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military relations are 
evidence of the major progress that has been achieved by both sides in maintaining post 
Cold War European security in a specific European region.  From the time the U.S. 
pressed for Ukraine’s unilateral nuclear disarmament, to strategic cooperation and recent 
political difficulties on a high level in bilateral relations, these events surprisingly have 
not affected negatively the defense and military arena, which demonstrates a strong 
tendency towards fostering Ukrainian and U.S. mutual interests. It may initially seem that 
the U.S. European aspirations toward Europe could undergo serious considerations; 
however, according to Defense Secretary Ramsfeld September 2001 Quadrennial 
Defense Review, strategy-driven choices for American security in Europe remain on the 
same or even greater importance.  The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review renewed U.S. 
interest in Europe, stressing the role of the U.S. military in maintaining a security 
posture: 
…The United States remains seriously engaged in European affairs, and 
the Armed Forces will be an important tool in the transatlantic 
relationship…  U.S. European Command… responsible for monitoring 
and responding to events in all Europe, including many of former Soviet 
Union… the United States would be better served by a force posture 
designed specifically to address the existing and likely security 
environment in this region…  American forces in Europe also have 
worked closely with such nations as Ukraine…  A significant American 
presence in Europe is essential to demonstrating the enduring nature of the 
transatlantic relationship and to providing a continuing incentive for the 
Europeans to ensure that their military forces can operate effectively with 
the U.S. military in the future.27 
                                                 
27 Quadrennial Defense Review 2001, Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, pp. 237-242. 
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The timeframe for Ukrainian – U.S. political-military relations has been 
developing unsteadily, and sometimes, controversially.  However, practical outcomes of 
the last decade show significant progress as relations influence the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces transition to democratic civil-military relations and help Ukraine claim its role 
within European and a global security system.  
One of the main elements of cooperation, the Ukrainian – American Bilateral 
Working Group (BWG) initially called the Colonels Conference, was organized in 1993 
and soon became the main element to review, oversee and make propositions concerning 
questions on future cooperative development.  The U.S. unfading interest toward 
Ukrainian nuclear disarmament led to the ‘Agreement between Ukraine and the United 
States of America as to Providing Ukraine with Strategic Nuclear Weapons Liquidation’s 
Help, and also Nuclear Biologic Chemical (NBC) Weapons Counterproliferation.’  The 
Ukrainian Foreign Minister A.M. Zlenko and the U.S. State Secretary W. Kristopher 
signed the Agreement on 25 October 1993.      
The result of BWG’s active involvement in development and control processes, in 
1996 defense and military relations, has received a significant shift toward progressing.  
As soon as Ukraine joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) – 
multinational exercises, called Peace Shield, they have become a calling card of the 
U.S.’s help to Ukraine in conducting multinational professional military training.  
High level Ukrainian – U.S. political relations skyrocketed on 19 September 1996 
when both sides announced the creation of the Ukrainian – U.S. Binational Commission, 
more notably known as the Kuchma – Gore Commission.  It is a political, economic and 
military mechanism to coordinate the U.S. and Ukraine bilateral relations and a variety of 
U.S. programs for Ukraine.  Subsequently, the BWG, as an integral part of the 
Commission, had become one of the rapidly progressing mechanisms.  Bilateral defense 
and military cooperation had been stated as “one of the largest in Europe” by the Kuchma 
- Gore Commission’s Joint Statement: 
The two sides noted that the scope and size of the bilateral U.S.-Ukrainian 
defense and military cooperation program is one of the largest in Europe 
and is testimony to the strength of the strategic partnership of the two 
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countries…  The sides looked forward to the planned cooperation to help 
Ukraine establish a non-commissioned officer corps.28  
The Committee on Security Issues and the BWG within the framework of the 
Kuchma - Gore Commission soon became the primary bilateral forum to discuss 
international and national security issues.  The questions concerned Ukrainian 
participation in European and Transatlantic security structures, and strengthening 
Ukraine’s security in the international arena by supporting its military and defense 
reforms, which were substantial to committee meetings.  The committees have also 
highlighted Ukrainian – U.S. bilateral military and defense cooperation as an essential 
part of Ukraine’s fulfillment of the Ukraine – NATO Charter and extended PfP program.  
The Kuchma - Gore Commission had subsequently produced an even more promising 
and optimistic statement: 
United States – Ukraine cooperation in the security field… as well as 
military contacts, are an integral part of United States – Ukraine strategic 
partnership.  The sides stressed the importance of the continuing support 
for the reforms of Ukraine’s Armed Forces.  During the past year, 
cooperation has begun in a number of [new] important areas.  Practical 
cooperation has started in the further development, with United States 
support, of the Yavoriv Training Area for training peacekeeping forces 
and holding joint exercises by the Armed Forces of Ukraine, NATO 
member states, and partner countries.  The sides collaborate in promoting 
the NATO decision on setting up at Yavoriv a training center under the 
PfP program.29    
During the next meeting in Newport, Rhode Island, in June 2000, both sides 
discussed and initiated new directions for defense and military cooperation such as: 
• Defense reform in Ukraine (Ukrainian Armed Forces professionalisation, 
joint program of military education development) 
• Ukrainian Armed Forces Joint Assessment Program 
• Joint Consultative Economic Committee (Military Base Closure Program, 
RAND research on economic and defense questions), military cooperation 
assessment (Ukraine- American military-to-military contacts program) 
                                                 
28 U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission Joint Statement, available [online]: 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/fulltext/kuchgore/state1.htm; assessed 03 December 2002. 
29 U.S.-Ukraine Binational Commission Joint Statement, available [online]: 
http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/ukraine/fulltext/kuchgore/state1.htm; assessed 03 December 2002. 
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• The first year of Ukrainian – American Military Liaison Team operations, 
Ukrainian – Polish – American Trilateral Cooperation and Yavoriv 
peacekeeping exercises 
• Defense aid such as Foreign Military Sales Program (FMF) and 
International Military Education Program (IMET), cooperation in the area 
of military science and technology 
Unfortunately, the new White House Administration in 2001 unilaterally 
suspended Ukrainian – U.S. Binational Commission activities and proposed to rename 
the BWG the Ukrainian – American Committee on Security Issues.  Generally, the 
Ukraine – U.S. mechanism for political-military cooperation remained untouched.  
However, from a civil-military relations point of view, its ability to arrange and 
coordinate bilateral economic and political activities with the military has been lost.  
Civilian and military professionals, mostly represented by the defense agencies, 
constitute a limited possibility to influence bilateral relations on the legislative level.   
BWG 2001’s session intensified joint programs in the areas of peacekeeping 
activities, joint programs and joint defense analysis, exactly as both sides agreed: 
• Conducting joint defense analysis in Ukraine 
• Further development of Ukrainian – Polish – U.S. trilateral military 
cooperation, and paying attention to the questions of joint peacekeeping 
exercises at the Yavoriv training center 
• Further transition of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to a contract manning system 
• Continuing work in the area of military education and personnel policy 
• Continuing preparation of professional noncommissioned (NCO) corps 
• Furthering of cooperation between the U.S. Department of Defense, the 
Ukrainian National Defense Academy and its Peacekeeping Center 
• Continuing the military bases closure program and the questions of its 
adaptation economically 
• Furthering joint work on environmental security issues 
• Continuing work on military-technical and scientific cooperation 
• Creation of Joint Consultative Group in the FMF Program 
• Continuing work on the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) 
• Development of the Joint Work Document as the basic paper of further 
bilateral defense and military cooperation 
 24
The BWG session in 2002 scrutinized the applicability of Ukrainian – U.S. 
relations in defense and military spheres in the aftermath of the events of September 11th.  
Firstly, the terrorist’s threat to obtain weapons of mass destruction emphasized the 
importance of the work of the CTR Program.  Secondly, the Americans have widely 
encouraged the Ukrainian decision to join NATO.  It was positively expressed at BWG’s 
senior-level meetings.  Thirdly, the Ukrainian side has been actively involved in 
international antiterrorist activity that significantly accentuated the level of joint work in 
the security area.  Fourthly, the outcomes of the Joint Defense Assessment have allowed 
the creation of the Ukrainian Rapid Reaction Forces with practical incentives.  
Meetings of senior-level officials emphasized that the size of the Ukrainian 
involvement in bilateral cooperation plays a positive role concerning the question of 
Ukrainian membership in NATO where the U.S. occupies a leading position.  Ukrainian 
entry into European economic and security structures, especially in NATO, is mentioned 
to be of high priority for Ukraine’s foreign policy.  
The BWG session also marked the next achievements in the work on joint 
initiatives: 
• Joint Defense Assessment results provided to Ukraine will help realize the 
goals mentioned in the State Program of the Reformation and 
Development of the Ukraine Armed Forces until 2005 
• The concept and issues connected with the creation of the Rapid Reaction 
Forces  
• Ukrainian – Polish – American Trilateral cooperation – both sides agreed 
on the importance of its further long-term development, its support in 
conducting the defense reform according to NATO standards, the usage of 
Ukrainian – Polish peacekeeping battalion experience during the training 
of Ukrainian peacekeeping units, and conducting trilateral staff talks 
• Both sides discussed FMF future usage rules as financing the Ukrainian 
portion of the Ukrainian-Polish peacekeeping battalion and the FMF 
future reorientation toward the sponsoring of the Ukrainian Rapid 
Reaction Forces.  Both sides also revised the Joint Consultative Group’s 
first year’s work on the FMF Program  
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• The program for the transition of Ukraine’s Armed Forces to a contract manning 
system and the preparation of a professional NCO corps– both sides agreed 
that the U.S. will provide financial and technical support to create the 
automatic accounting system in military recruiting centers and contractor 
financial support.  Both sides also agreed to the possibility for Ukrainian 
NCO instructors to train at U.S. NCO Academies 
• Both sides discussed further technical support for the Yavoriv PfP training 
center 
• Both sides emphasized the importance of further conferences about 
military education and personnel policy reforms of the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces.  A critical analysis of the previous work and the development of 
propositions for future activity in this field are essential to building well 
balanced and a strong defense policy-oriented system.  Both sides also 
stressed the need for maintaining information by providing the Ukrainians 
with computer systems 
• Both sides criticized military base closures and their environmental clean-
up afterwards and further economical adaptation to civilian life because of 
the lack of practical applications.  The Ukrainians proposed the draft of a 
project in this area that includes questions concerning the transformation 
of military bases into commercial and industrial zones and resolves their 
environmental problems 
• Both sides discussed further destruction of the infrastructure of weapons 
of mass destruction and agreed on a new phase of conducting this 
disarmament, which includes the fuel components of the SS-24 missiles of 
strategic bombers.  According to the mutual agreement on Cooperative 
Threat Reduction Program expansion – in the area of biological weapons 
elements counterproliferation and the trade of illegal weapons of mass 
destruction 
• Both sides agreed to pay a significant amount of attention to the programs 
for the social development programs of the Armed Forces such as the 
development of the ‘Olive-tree branch’ program to help military 
psychological rehabilitation in Ukraine 
The main initiatives and new dimensions of Ukraine – American defense and 
military cooperation were introduced in the Joint Work Document as previously agreed 
upon.  It was also agreed that further cooperation would be closely tied to the goals and 
objectives of Ukrainian national defense and military reform.  Both sides have stressed 
that defense and military cooperation continues to develop as a vital element of a 
Ukrainian and American partnership in the security area.  Bilateral Working Groups, as 
the main originators of ideas in defense and military relations, have contributed 
significantly to the ability of Ukrainian and U.S. civilians and the military to work 
together to resolve questions on defense and military issues.  The results of joint work are 
crucial, and can range from developing the first bilateral military activities to 
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implementing programs on defense reform.  At the same time, the thesis argues that 
reemphasizing the importance of the gamut of bilateral issues in the implementation of 
comprehensive development and control of democratic civil-military relations elements 
would contribute to a gradual increase in the efficiency of the functioning of the Ukraine 
defense system.  
The exchange visits between Ukrainian and U.S. senior defense and military 
officials play discernible roles in shaping important decisions concerning military and 
defense cooperation.  The visit of the First Ukrainian Minister of Defense, General-
Colonel Morozov, in April 1992 to the United States opened a new era for Ukraine as an 
independent European security player in the international arena.  Further exchanges 
between the heads of the military agencies have demonstrated that this area of defense 
cooperation plans plays a significant role by showing countries mutual emphasis on 
accepting common methods concerning bilateral security, defense and military issues.  
Chronologically, the goals and outcomes of high defense level exchange visits are 
presented in the following table.  
 
Year of event Comments 
April 11, 1992 Ukrainian Minister of Defense Kostiantyn Morozov visited USA first time 
in Ukrainian history at the invitations U.S. Secretary of Defense Dick 
Cheney. Morozov visits military installations 
 
June 6-7, 1993 U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspen visited Ukraine to discuss security 
matters. Maked proposals concerning dismantling Ukrainian nuclear 
weapons to be followed closely by dismantling Russian ones, reimbursing 
Ukraine for the uranium, and the possibility of sealing U.S. commitment to 
Ukraine's security by means of a charter of U.S.-Ukrainian relations 
 
July 25-30, 1993 Ukrainian Minister of Defense Kostiantyn Morozov visited USA and 
signed the ‘Memorandum of Mutual Understanding and Cooperation in 
the Area of Defense and Military Relations Between Ukrainian Ministry of 
Defense and United State Department of Defense.’ on June 27  
 
March 21-23, 1994 During a visit to Ukraine, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry promised 
$100 million in aid for the denuclearization and military conversion 
process 
 
June 13-19, 1994 Ukrainian Defense Minister Vitally Radetskyi visit to the U.S., with 
agreements reached on broadening military cooperation 
 
November 13-16, 1994 Ukrainian Vice-Prime Minister and soon Minister of Defense Valeriy 
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Year of event Comments 
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Shmarov visited U.S. to formalize the mechanism and aims of aid to 
Ukraine through the Nunn-Lugar Act 
 
March 31-April 1, 1995 U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry visited Ukraine and moved past 
issues of nuclear disarmament to questions of social protection, security 
and military and economic cooperation. Secretary Ferry watched the 
destruction of an SS- 19 missile in Pervomaiske 
 
May, 1995 U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry visited Yavoriv training center in 
Western Ukraine to review ‘Peace Shield – 95’ - the first U.S.- Ukraine 
joint peacekeeping exercise under the PfP program.  2-week training 
program 
 
January 4-5, 1996 U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry visited Ukraine.  Signed agreement 
with Ukrainian Defense Minister Valeriy Shmarov on closer military 
cooperation between U.S. and Ukraine.  Discussed NATO expansion and 
possibility of trilateral military training exercises during meeting with 
Shmarov and Grachev. Also met with President Kuchma.  Secretary Perry, 
Ukrainian Minister of Defense Shmarov, and Russian Defense Minister 
Pavel Grachev went to Pervomaiske, Mikolaiv Oblast, Ukraine to watch 
destruction of an ICBM missile silo. (The third of 130 to be dismantled by 
November 1998, according to START-I treaty 
 
April 28-May 2, 1997 Ukrainian Minister of Defense Col.-Gen. Oleksandr Kuzmuk’s first visit 
to the U.S. Met with U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen. Ukraine 
received $47 million of assistance to dismantle nuclear missile silos and 
transportation facilities/ devices 
 
July 11-12, 1997 Official visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen to Ukraine to 
discuss prospects for military cooperation.  Secretary Cohen visited the 
joint military exercises ‘Cooperative Neighbor-97’ and met with chief 
Ukraine Security and Defense Council (USDC) Valerii Horbulin and 
Ukrainian Defense Minister 
 
November 10, 1998 Ukrainian Minister of Defense Col.-Gen. Oleksandr Kuzmuk’s visit to the 
USA.  The sides reiterated mutual interest in continuing and deepening 
bilateral cooperation.  The Minister for Defense and the U.S. Secretary of 
Defense signed a plan of cooperation between the respective state agencies 
for the period through 1999 
 
July 31, 1999 U.S. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen’s visit to Ukraine.  Defense 
agencies’ chiefs met concerning the continued progress in the relationship 
of military and defense matters 
 
March 29 – April 1, 2000 Ukrainian Minister of Defense Col.-Gen. Oleksandr Kuzmuk’s visit to the 
USA.  The Agreement about military-technical information exchange has 
signed 
 
June 4-5, 2001 New U.S. White House Administration’s Defense Secretary Donald 
Rumsfield political visit to Ukraine.  Rumsfeld assured Ukraine in further 
deepening bilateral security, defense and military cooperation.  Chiefs of 
Year of event Comments 
defense ministries elaborated future perspective direction of bilateral 
defense cooperation and its legal basis.  U.S. Defense Secretary met with 
Ukrainian president L. Kuchma and chief of USDC Y.Marchuk 
 
October 23-26, 2002 Ukrainian Minister of Defense V.Shkidcheko’s first visit to USA.  
Discussed January – April, 2003 NATO’s Joint Defense Assessment of 
Ukrainian Armed Forces, U.S. aid to Ukrainian Rapid Reaction Forces, 
terrorism issues and the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  
 
 
Table 3.   Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense Chiefs 
Exchange Visits.  
* From: The Courtesy of Department of International Cooperation Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and 
Ukrainian Embassy to the U.S. 
  
The frequency of the visits between the U.S. and Ukrainian Department of 
Defense visits and their practical context exceeds any of the other exchange visits 
between Ukrainian ministries and U.S. departments can be characterized by the level of 
cooperation that is the most strategically important level for both countries.  The security 
concerns of the U.S. in Ukraine as well as Ukrainian reciprocity in furthering defense and 
military relations with the U.S. have also been considered during visits at a high 
ministerial and departmental level.  The exchange visits mainly focused on the questions 
of Ukrainian nuclear disarmament during the first years the military departments heads 
were in office.  However, the subsequent development in relations played a positive role 
in discovering other directions for bilateral relations in the areas of defense and military 
practical applications.  
Brent Scowcroft has stated in hindsight that it was a mistake for the 
United States to have concentrated so much of its bilateral effort on the 
nuclear question.  The Clinton administration had the benefit of the 
travails of its predecessor and, while it started off on sour note, appears to 
have steadied the relationship and embarked on a broader relationship with 
Ukraine. This development is a course for optimism.30  
                                                 
30 Roman Popadiuk, American-Ukrainian Nuclear Relations, McNair Paper 55, Institute for National 
Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington DC, October 1996. 
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Ukrainian – U.S. contacts at a high defense level had intensified during the 
Clinton Administration years and a significant amount of attention was centered on 
security and military development questions. 
The next important phase of defense and military cooperation between Ukraine 
and the U.S. is participation in joint programs.  The mechanism for bilateral defense and 
military interactions in the programs were mostly directed at helping Ukraine realize the 
State Programme of Ukrainian Armed Forces Reformation and Development until 2005 
and the State Programme of Ukrainian Armed Forces Building and Development until 
2005, which: 
…Became the first comprehensive document, which determines priority 
areas and goals for military development.  More importantly, it linked and 
harmonized military development to the general process of State 
development…  [The goal of the programs is]  The establishment of the 
modern AF, which will be optimum in strength, mobile, well equipped, 
supported and trained, capable of fulfilling their missions in any 
environment and at the same time not a burden on country's budget.31 
The main elements of bilateral defense and military efforts concentrated on the 
participation of countries in the following programs: 
• Cooperative Threat Reduction Program  
• Defense Resources operation and Planning Program 
• International Military Education Program  
• Noncommissioned officers Development Program 
• Foreign Military Sales and Finance Programs with “Warsaw initiative” 
program involvement” 
• Harvard’s National Security Program for Senior Officials 
• George Marshall Center of Security Studies program 
• International Health Protection and Resources Program Medical 
Cooperation Program 
• Military Education Development Program until 2005 
• Military Communication and Information Program 
                                                 
31 The State programme of the Ukrainian Armed Forces reform and development until 2005. Available 
[online]: http://www.mil.gov.ua/old/eng/derg_prog/index.htm; accessed January 16, 2003. 
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• Ukrainian Armed Forces Transition to Contract Manning System Program 
• Military Bases Closure and its Ecological Clean up Program 
• Joint Defense Assessment Program 
The CTR Program was implemented as a result of the Agreement between 
Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and U.S. Department of Defense as to Providing Ukraine 
with Technical Means and Services with Connection to Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
Dismantling from December 5th, 1993, the Program of Phased Reduction and Liquidation 
Strategic Offence Weapons in Ukraine from November 16, 1993.  The CTR program 
includes the elimination of Ballistic Missile Complexes; of the infrastructure of weapons 
of mass destruction, of the toxic fuel components of strategic missiles and of combat 
strategic delivery vehicles.  This program has obtained significant financial aid from the 
United States.32 
The Defense Resources Operation and Planning Program (DROP) was directed 
based on the exchange of strategically well-grounded thoughts and a system analyses 
within the framework of the allocation and operation of defense resources.  The program 
also defines the main direction and perspectives of cooperation in the areas of defense 
economy, scientifically substantiated models of military budget building and 
development.  The goals of the program elements are to transition to a program-oriented 
method of defense recourses allocation and operation, which is widely employed in the 
defense agencies of western countries.  The DROP includes a variety of sub-programs 
that initially support the main program initiatives.  These initiatives are the program of 
revitalizing military arsenals and ammunition dumps from 1995 until 2015, the Program 
of Military Aviation Restoration and Modernization; the program on converting military 
areas and the Program on the utilization of outdated ammunition, weapons and military 
materials.    
Soon after Ukrainian – U.S. military cooperation was established, according to a 
mutual agreement, Ukraine has become an active participant of the U.S.-founded 
                                                 
32 More information on Ukraine’s WMD removal contains in Roman Popadiuk’s paper. American-
Ukrainian Nuclear Relations. McNair Paper 55, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense 
University, Washington DC, October 1996. 
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International Military Education and Training Program.  The IMET program generally 
comprises three phases: in-country language preparation, language training within the 
U.S. and follow-on training in U.S. military facilities.  
 
Year Quantity 
1992   1 










Table 4.   Ukrainian Civilian and Military IMET-Trained Personnel in the U.S. 1992 
– 2001.  
* From: The Courtesy of Main Personnel Department Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and Office of 
Defense Cooperation U.S. Embassy to Ukraine. 
 
The IMET program is a cornerstone of providing Ukraine with civilian and 
military professionals able to understand and adapt to the Western military and political 
climate.  Many officers still occupy important positions within the Ukrainian Armed 
Forces while many have already left military service.  Such cadres of existing problems 
are the area of responsibility of the Ukrainian Defense Ministry, –and shrinking military 
budgets and no future perspectives, cause them to decide in favor of civilian life.  
The greatest fault with international military education training is the 
belief that many officer-graduates will rise to positions of prominence in 
their armed forces.  IMET does not require retention in exchange for free 
education, and Ukraine has done poorly at using these highly trained 
officers.  Transparency in the nomination process, clear and detailed 
guidelines outlining minimum qualifications, and accountability for 
 32
retaining and assigning officers should be instituted as prerequisites for 
IMET.33  
Taking into account the aforementioned issues, the policy towards the use of the 
IMET program should be revised in such a way that more qualified candidates are 
selected now and in the future.  It is also true that the questions raised are not completely 
the area of responsibility of the Ministry of Defense.  Civilian and military leadership 
efforts should be directed towards encouraging military service in order to prevent the 
danger of a loss of military professionals.  
The Noncommissioned officers (NCO) Development Program that began in 1997 
is relatively new to the Ukrainian military establishment.  The program places significant 
attention on the proficiency and preparedness level of the Ukraine Armed Forces NCO 
Corps as the main functional element of the daily activity of the armed forces.  Ukraine 
has inherited a relatively weak NCO Corps, mostly because of the increased role of 
officers in the Soviet Armed Forces.  The program is anticipating assistance from the 
U.S. to conduct Ukrainian NCO training in Ukraine as well as in the U.S. and is directly 
related to the State Programme of Ukrainian Armed Forces Development and 
Reformation until 2005 that envisages that military NCO Corps reform will occur.  The 
professional NCO Corps is estimated be the core of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, 
which are expected to be under full contract until 2015.  According to the latest data, 35 
NCO’s received their professional training in the U S., while 11 had served in Ukrainian 
peacekeeping battalions.  The program helped create the NCO Academies in the 
Ukrainian Army and Air Force.  
The Foreign Military Sales and Finance Programs, with the help of “Warsaw 
initiative” funds were implemented according to President Clinton’s 1994 initiative 
whose goal was financial support to PfP-member countries.  Ukrainian - U.S. military 
training programs and participation in international exercises, such as “Peace Shield” and 
“Sea Breese”, were conducted on Ukrainian territory with funding from these “Warsaw 
initiative” funds.  The FMF and FMS programs also provided the Ukrainian 
                                                 
33 Timothy C. Shea, “U.S. – Ukraine Relations. Shaping on NATO Doorstep,” Joint Force Quarterly, 
Autumn-Winter 2001-2002.   
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peacekeeping battalion in Kosovo with financial support estimated at $7.6 million up to 
2001.  Throughout 2001, during the BWG session, both sides agreed to create a 
consultative group, expected to define the priority of expenditures in the context of 
existing programs to better benefit Ukraine’s inquiries and to make it possible to direct 
material and technical support according to the key priorities of the Ukraine Armed 
Forces.  
The Harvard National Security Program for Ukrainian Senior Officials34 began 
in 1997.  The program is specifically dedicated to helping Ukrainian military and civilian 
governmental officials who work in the area of national security and defense with 
modern European and world security system incentives.  It includes a Harvard University 
course of lectures; activities at NATO’s headquarters, visiting the U.S. Naval Base 
Norfolk, the U.S. Department of Defense and the International Institute of Strategic 
Studies in London.  
The George Marshall European Center of Security Studies Program35 supports 
the study of efforts in the area of security problems such as resident courses for Ukrainian 
civilians and the military, collaboration in the ‘Electronic Library’, and the project of the 
consortium of defense academies. 
The remainder of the joint programs encompasses areas of professional 
responsibility.  Generally, each program pursues specific goals and objectives that can 
only be applied to specific areas.  However, the progress of each individual program 
contributes to all bilateral cooperation of other countries.  Unfortunately, the mechanism, 
which is able to effectively trace such contributions and to make propositions or 
corrections to the existing variety of programs, has found the operating strategy to be 
difficult.  As a result, partial misunderstandings with countries that have different 
approaches to the goals of defense and military cooperation have occurred throughout the 
                                                 
34 Integrity Remains Key To Ukraine Stability, Security. Harvard University Gazette, 7 December 
2002, Available [On-Line]: Http://Www.News.Harvard.Edu/Gazette/2000/12.07/09-Ukraine.Html; 
Accessed 14 January 2003. 
35 George C. Marshall European Center For Security Studies, Available [On-Line]: 
Http://Www.Marshallcenter.Org/Mcweb/Site-Graphic/Lang-En/Page-Mc-Index-1/Doc-Mc-Index-
Picture.Htm; Accessed 14 January 2003.  
 34
cooperation phase.  The lack of a general Ukrainian strategy to effectively link the State 
Programs of Armed Forces Building and Development to existing cooperation elements 
has consequently led to ‘distortions’, ‘mutual disappointment and alienation’ between 
American and Ukrainian military relations organizational managers.  The opinion exists 
that: 
Subsequent initiatives have shown poorer results.  In the beginning, 
shaping activity was loosely regulated and allowed activity managers 
substantial discretion.  Engagement activity has become more regulated 
over time and resources less available.  Meanwhile, Ukraine’s perception 
of its strategic value to the West has grown proportionally with its 
expectations of even greater material incentives.  This distortion has 
resulted in mutual disappointment and alienation, a vicious cycle that 
threatens to spin out of control as each side increasingly views the other as 
insincere and exploitative.36  
On the other hand, the American approaches to control and oversight of bilateral 
cooperation were initially well-grounded, and Ukraine has subsequently agreed with such 
propositions.  The creation of such elements of control and oversight, such as the 
Bilateral Working Group, Ukrainian-American Joint Staff Talks, The Military-to-Military 
Programs Development Conference and Ukrainian-American Military Liaison Team has 
contributed many positive motivational procedures for bilateral relations.  However, as 
time passes, these elements have become slow to be adapted and are sometimes 
confusing not only to the Ukrainians but also to their American counterparts.  A variety 
of leverage mechanisms, greatly intertwined initiatives that often lack real operational 
postures in the U.S. Government and military circles, have resulted in a control 
‘vacuum’: 
Responsibility for the overall engagement strategy toward Ukraine 
remains fragmented.  All actions are supposed to complement the Mission 
Performance Plan (MPP), approved by the ambassador for all Federal 
agencies operating under the umbrella of the country team in Kiev, but 
MPP, NATO activity, and the U.S. European command (EUCOM) 
Military Contacts Program all exist without one master. 
                                                 
36 Timothy C. Shea, “U.S. – Ukraine Relations. Shaping on NATO Doorstep,” Joint Force Quarterly, 
Autumn-Winter 2001-2002.   
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In this vacuum, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) works to 
formulate sound engagement policy and sponsors interagency working 
group sessions…  OSD receives little help in managing engagement.  No 
nation body oversees the effort to integrate the political, economic, and 
informational of national power with the military.37   
During the 2002 Ukrainian- American military-to-military contacts program 
planning conference, the Americans provided a detailed explanation of the Joint Defense 
Assessment (JDA) concept.  The goal of the JDA is to define and to provide the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces with assessments, on the basis of military units declared by 
Ukraine, with recommendations as to their future training, equipment, material, technical 
and social support that corresponds to the standards employed in NATO countries.  The 
program also provides provisions for a functional effectiveness assessment and its 
capabilities to achieve the level of full integration with NATO elements.  The scale of the 
JDA’s proposed actions is defined applicably to the activity of different branches of the 
Ukrainian Armed Forces.  The creation of the Ukrainian Rapid Reaction Forces, which 
could be able to effectively react to European and global civil and military emergency 
changes, was proposed as the element of the first assessment.  
The methodology of the Joint Defense Assessment includes: 
• To be familiar with conceptual papers that define Ukraine’s national 
security, such as the Ukrainian National Security Concept, the Ukrainian 
Military Doctrine and the State Program of Ukrainian Armed Forces 
Reformation and Development until 2005 
• To familiarize Americans with the documents defining the basis of the 
activity of Ukrainian military units 
• The U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Staff and the Ukrainian Ministry of 
Defense and General Staff representatives visit designated units to 
familiarize themselves with their daily activities 
• To generalize received information and to prepare concrete 
recommendations and propositions to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense 
and General Staff to coordinate further activities 
• The received information will define the main directions of U.S. financial 
support, which will be used in long-term bilateral cooperation programs 
                                                 
37 Timothy C. Shea, “U.S. – Ukraine Relations. Shaping on NATO Doorstep,” Joint Force Quarterly, 
Autumn-Winter 2001-2002.   
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Since the U.S. proposal to conduct the JDA in Ukraine occurred shortly before the 
Ukrainian decision to apply for NATO membership, the development of the Ukrainian 
position was controversial.  The JDA is one of the most explicit engagement elements to 
test the ability of Ukraine to obtain future NATO membership.  The Ukrainian Armed 
Forces was expected to be transparent to the scale of the proposed events.  The thesis 
makes an assumption that the proposed program, in addition to the latest intensified 
activity of Russia with NATO, has pushed the Ukrainian political leadership to agree to 
the JDA being conducted in Ukraine as a way to ascend to future membership in NATO.  
The complexity of bilateral activities in the framework of the JDA in terms of the 
exchange of classified information requires further efforts to create conditions favorable 
to the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which are still underway.  
The recent crisis in Ukrainian – U.S. relations at a high political level has made this 
question even more difficult.38  
The Plan of Cooperation between Ukrainian Ministry of Defense and U.S. 
Department of Defense is one of the high priority documents defining the entire spectrum 
of defense and military cooperation between the two countries.  Recent cooperation 
between Ukraine and the U.S. mostly concentrates on achieving the Plan’s connection to 
programs for the transition and development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  The main 
areas of bilateral initiatives highlighted in the Plan are: 
• Cooperation in security (possible threats) areas 
• Military interoperability 
• Armed Forces Professionalisation 
• Civil-military relations 
• Defense Structuring and Resourcing 
• Defense Support Issues 
• Military Scientific and Technical Cooperation 
 
 
                                                 
38 The situation characterized by the sharpened tensions between Ukrainian opposition and the 
Ukrainian President’s Administration, the international community’s accusations of Ukraine selling the air-
defense systems “Kolchuga” to Iraq, the situation of freedom of speech, corruption etc.   
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B. MILITARY COOPERATION 
The primary goal of military and military-technical cooperation is to fulfill the 
political agenda of defense cooperation.  The Ukraine – American Military-to-Military 
Contacts Program first started in 1994, and since that time, the document has become 
fully operational in coordinating military activities between the two countries.  The 
program is responsible for conducting bilateral military exchange visits, bilateral and 
multilateral military exercises involving the Ukrainian and American Army, Air Force, 
Navy, National Guard, Border Guard, Coast Guard and Ministry of Emergencies 
components.  Due to the specific nature of the U.S. military components organization, the 
program helped to initiate the interoperability within Ukrainian military components, 
though they still remain strategically and operationally independent.  For this reason, 
program coordination is especially important to the Ukrainian military components with 
the overall goal of their future unified coordination to handle various sorts of emergency 
situations, the questions of border control and prevention of drug trafficking.  
Military cooperation consists of conducting bilateral and multilateral exercises 
and military exchange visits.  Initially, the bilateral exercises Peace Shield and Sea 
Breese, started in 1995 and 1997 respectively, soon became a multilateral component 
counting the participation of 11-20 countries.  Also conducted in the spirit of the 
Partnership for Peace and State Partnership39 Programs, the exercises are the primary test 
for interoperability between American and Ukrainian military components.   
Exercises conducted under the auspices of PfP are designed to promote 
interoperability for future peace support missions that involve NATO and 
PfP nations. 
Exercise Sea Breeze is an in-the-spirit-of Partnership-for-peace (PfP) 
exercise hosted by Ukraine... have a complete exercise phased operation 
designed to improve standards of interoperability between participating 
partner and NATO units by conducting a crisis command post exercise 
and a maritime and ground live exercise focusing on peace support 
operations…allows staff representatives of the participating nations to 
practice humanitarian relief operations from the sea.  The exercise 
…promote common understanding of humanitarian assistance doctrine, 
                                                 
39 For more information on the State Partnership Program, go to 
http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Exercises/SPP/StockholdersBook.pdf. 
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search and rescue doctrine and the conduct of multinational maritime 
relief operations… 
Peaceshield is a multi-national, battalion-computer assisted command post 
exercise, designed to train battalion commanders and staffs as they 
validate and further develop combined tactics, techniques and procedures 
for peace support operations.40 
The number of military exchange visits has been steadily increasing since 1994. 





1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 



















2 3 7 4 8 7 9 14 9 
Army, Navy, Air 
Force visits 
5 7 15 11 7 9 22 24 19 
Joint Military 
Exercises  
0 0 2 3 3 8 4 5 3 
Ship Visits 0 0 3 0 8 18 21 22 4 
 
Table 5.   Ukrainian – American Bilateral Military Contacts 1993 – 2001 
Development Dynamics. 
*   Completed events 
** From: the courtesy of Department of International Cooperation Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. 
 
Started mostly from events proposed by the Americans, at the end of 1999 and the 
beginning of 2000, the program had begun to count on Ukrainian propositions.  From 
1993 to the present, the main fields of concern in the program were: 
• The area of potential threats, which includes weapons of mass destruction 
nonproliferation, protection and the response to terrorist threats 
• The area of military interoperability, which includes conducting 
multilateral exercises, senior military leadership exchange visits, ship’s 
port visits, military exchange visits in the areas of strategic 
communications, air defense, airfield requirements, meteorology, 
personnel training, logistics, search and rescue operations, peace-support 
operations 
                                                 
40 United States European Command web-site, available [online]: 
http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/index.htm?http://www.eucom.mil/Directorates/ECPA/Exercises
/main.htm&2; accessed 12 January 2003. 
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• The area of force professionalization such as recruiting centers 
information, NCO career management, border air defense and terrorists 
countermeasures, military engineers project management, military police, 
legal service and logistic support 
• The area of civil-military relations exchange visits, which includes 
conducting Rough & Ready exercises - California National Guard 
Combined Civil-Military Operations Center Events, disaster response 
operations, legal issues visits, public affairs training program budgeting 
and military topography 
• The area of defense structuring and resoursing and defense support 
issues41  
C. CONCLUSION 
The recent analysis provides an opportunity to offer some possible propositions as 
to the structural and functional regulation of the existing cooperation strategy.  The 
complex appearance of bilateral defense and military activity does not provide people 
coordinating cooperation with strictly defined goals and objectives that are easy to 
follow.  Having a busy schedule, Ukrainian – U.S. military contacts played a key role in 
forming the post-Cold War European security environment.  The questions that have 
been touched upon are concerned with almost all areas of military activities.  Such a great 
number of events and their practical implementation become possible because of the 
active involvement of both the Americans and Ukrainians in practical military issues.  At 
the same time, when significant success is achieved in various areas of military 
cooperation, the area of defense cooperation shows less promising results.   
The subsequent transition from ‘quantity into quality’, recently announced by 
Ukrainian and American counterparts has still not yielded desirable outcomes.  The entire 
scope of defense and military affairs between Ukraine and the U.S. presents a more 
fragmented than well-regulated mechanism.  Its lacks a well-balanced strategy that 
should originate within civilian circles, and then such a strategy comes from civilian 
authorities to the military.  Being successful in specific areas of cooperation does not 
necessarily contribute to the overall goals.  Coordination management in both courtiers 
needs to be connected to the overall strategic goals of the countries.  
                                                 
41 Appendix II. 2003 U.S. – Ukraine Military Contacts Program.  
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To be more transparent and efficient, the recent state of affairs in politico-military 
as well as other areas of defense and security cooperation can be significantly improved 
by creating the Joint White Book on security, defense and military relations between 
Ukraine and the U.S.  These are all prerequisites leading both sides to productive 
cooperation in this area: availability of legal and financial support, and experience of 
nearly a decade in dealing with common security, defense and military issues.  This book, 
by paying attention to the conditions of military service, will make it possible to employ 
civilian and military personnel who are new in this area with initial knowledge on 
bilateral cooperation issues with the goal of more quick and effective involvement in 
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IV. UKRAINE - U.S. MILITARY RELATIONS INFLUENCE ON 
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE UKRAINIAN ARMED FORCES 
TO DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS  
The problem of transitioning the Ukrainian Armed forces to civil-military 
relations corresponding to democratic principles has been dominant during the last 
decade since Ukrainian independence.  Western scholars and politicians view those 
relations as essential to building a democratic society in Ukraine.  The Ukrainians 
initially seemed to be unified in their aspirations with their western colleagues.  However, 
as the current situation indicates, the development of a sufficient mechanism for complete 
interactions between the civilian and military arenas in Ukraine has not yet been as 
effective as was expected.  This can be easily seen by analyzing the basic frameworks of 
democratic civil military relations, which are: 
• Facilitation of transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
processes 
• Ensuring democratic control of the armed forces 
• Clear legal and constitutional frameworks 
• Chain of command from military to government through a civilian 
Minister of Defense 
• Qualified civilians working with the military on defense policy, 
requirements as well as budgets 
• A clear vision of professional responsibility between civilian and military 
personnel 
• Effective oversight and review by parliament42  
What western scholars and politicians might see as an important achievement for 
civil-military relations is the prevention of military domination over the country during 
its independence. In reality, in the author’s opinion, this is not very significant in the 
Eastern-European arena.  Traditionally, military establishments in the Soviet Armed 
Forces and the post-Soviet society did not play a crucial role in the key points of a state’s 
                                                 
42 Stacy R. Closson, Civil-Military Relations in Sovereign Ukraine: Contributing or Detracting from 
the Security of a New Nation? Jennifer D.P. Morroney, Taras Kuzio, and Mikhail Molchanov, Ukrainian 
Foreign and Security Policy. Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives, Praeger Publishers, 2002.   
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governance, as it was in Spain and Latin America countries.  Most likely, the armed 
forces were not fully connected and clearly accountable to the political establishment, but 
to the Communist Party and obviously were separated from the people.  Therefore, the 
question about preventing military dominance in Ukraine as a significant merit of 
developing civil-military relations is not the focal point of continuing to develop 
democratic control over the military.  
Needless to say, Ukrainian nuclear disarmament was originally thought to be the 
main focus of U.S. military and civilian circles for initiating any kind of relations with 
Ukraine, and partly as a result, the first few years of relations between Ukraine and the 
United States were irrevocably lost from a democratic civil-military relations transition 
standpoint.  Further continuation of bilateral relations was placing special emphasis on 
the questions of military professionalism. However, the author views this situation 
differently.  In her book, ‘Democratizing Communist Militaries’, Marybeth Peterson 
Ulrich makes a point about the effectiveness of the U.S. military’s democratization 
approach in a variety programs in the Czech Republic and Russia “… their design flaws 
have limited achievement of their aims.”43  U.S. military relations’ approach toward 
Ukraine has plenty of such similarities.  
The thesis argues that the main efforts of Ukrainian – U.S. military relations 
should be directed towards strengthening the process of Ukrainian civilian and military 
cooperation, and acquiring the norms and principles of democratic civil-military relations 
and its gradual transition to that level.  Military professional programs are also important 
but they ought to play a subsequent or secondary role.  A Ukrainian Armed Forces seems 
unreal and vague without well-balanced civil-military relations in Ukraine.  The 
uncertainty of having sustainable, military equipment, corresponding to national security 
needs and finally obtaining full NATO membership also beg the question.  The United 
States, which already has a rich experience historically in building civil-military relations 
and the military relations with Ukraine as a most developed element in the country’s 
bilateral relations, is able to fulfill those ideas in an already existing and new-developed 
                                                 
43 Marybeth Peterson Ulrich, Democratizing Communist Militaries. The Cases of the Czech and 
Russian Armed Forces. The University of Michigan Press, 1999.  
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direction of Ukrainian – U.S. military cooperation.  The question is what are the possible 
directions for that improvement?             
The elements of the NATO document mentioned previously are more significant 
in continuing to build and develop a sufficient level of civil-military relations and the 
further promotion of the process of democratic consolidation in Ukraine.  The present 
chapter analyzes the level of influence of Ukrainian – U.S. military relations on such 
elements of democratic civil-military relations and formulates the policy 
recommendations of its possible further development.  The chapter’s research question is 
a sub-question of the thesis research question - ‘How the recent state of things in 
Ukrainian – U.S. military sphere helps the process of Ukrainian Armed Forces transition 
to democratic civil-military relations?’      
It must be mentioned that the development of democratic civil-military relations 
in Ukraine is impossible without structuring and encouraging the five main areas of a 
consolidated democracy: civil society, political society, the rule of law, state apparatus, 
and economic society.44  Recent analysis shows that apparently, the military sphere in 
Ukraine is more democratic than the civilian.  The present imbalance between civilian 
and military democratic development is especially evident in the recent political situation 
in Ukraine.45  Therefore, cohesive development of those areas is mandatory to guarantee 
effective and efficient development of democratic civil-military relations in Ukraine.  The 
hope is that the new national Security Conception that has been approved in the first 
reading by the Ukraine Supreme Council on October 22, 2002 will postulate clear goals 
for Ukraine transatlantic integration, which is impossible without having a democratic 
level of civil-military relations.     
 
 
                                                 
44 Juan J. Linz, Alfred Stephan. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press Baltimore and London, 1996.   
45 The situation characterized by the sharpened tensions between Ukrainian opposition and the 
Ukrainian President Administration, the international community’s accusations to Ukraine of selling to Iraq 
passive air-surveillance systems “Kolchuga”, the situation with a freedom of speech, corruption etc.   
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A. FACILITATION OF TRANSPARENCY IN NATIONAL DEFENSE 
PLANNING AND BUDGETING PROCESSES 
Although, transparency in budget, personnel and policy formulation is crucial not 
only for the process of developing democratic civil-military relations but also for the 
existence of the Armed Forces, it remains unclear and insufficiently regulated.  The best 
indicator is the condition of the financial system of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and 
assuming that the transparency of the defense budget process presupposes a clear 
mechanism for a Ukrainian civilian and military interagency organization.  The question 
of creating a budget in the three sections, the Supreme Council, the Cabinet of Ministers 
and the Ministry of Defense, does not seem very easy.  The principles of operations 
among these sections remain impermeable.  Although, western scholars appear to be 
more optimistic:   
But it is in the budgetary sphere where the Rada’s [Ukrainian Parliament] 
authority has grown most substantially and constructively.  It also in this 
sphere where the challenges of establishing of civil-democratic control can 
be seen most vividly. Until recently, the prerogatives granted to the Rada 
under the constitution to approve the defense budget did not provide a 
constructive check on executive power.  In the absence of transparent and 
disaggregated budget and sufficient corporate expertise, the Rada’s 
Commission on National Security and Defense had little to scrutinize, 
little basis for questioning the costs and assessment presented to them, and 
little choice but “take or leave it.”  Today realities… the commission’s 
basis has grown (assisting by growing collaboration with NGO) and its 
prerogatives strengthened by the work of the Rada’s Accounting 
Chamber.46 
The question about insufficient funds in the military budget and its transparency 
initially also did not seem obvious.  However, such components as budget detail 
information and its presence in the mass media and on the Internet implies much from its 
criticism by non-governmental and foreign organizations.  Unfortunately, the absence of 
information on the military budget on the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense official site does 
not allow a clear picture of the pros and cons to be presented. 
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The main efforts of Ukrainian – U.S. relations concerning this question are mainly 
concentrated in the International Military and Education Program (IMET).  The 
questions about utilizing specialists, for example in civil-military relations and defense 
budgeting, who are educated in the United States, have been expressed in the American 
mass media with greater apprehension:  
The greatest fault with international military education and training is the 
belief that many officer-graduates will rise to position of prominence in 
their armed forces.  IMET does not require retention in exchange for free 
education, and Ukraine has done poorly at using these highly trained 
officers.  Transparency in nomination process, clear and detailed 
guidelines outlining minimum qualifications, and accountability for 
retaining and assigning officers should be instituted as prerequisites for 
IMET.47   
The lack of structural mechanisms of nomination and coordination processes in 
that area of bilateral relations poses an explicit task about the possibility of the creation of 
a joint consultative mechanism in the framework of the military cooperation’s in already 
existing bilateral mechanisms, such as the annual Ukrainian – American Bilateral 
Defense Consultations (BDC).  
Lately, Ukraine has made a progressive step toward the process of transparent 
defense budgeting and defense policy by initiating the Joint Defense Assessment (JDA) 
with both NATO and U.S. military organizations.  JDA is part of a complex defense 
assessment program directed specifically at the process of the main defense components 
optimization by providing interoperability with the armed forces of NATO members, and 
even more importantly, the optimization of the needs and expenses of the Ukrainian 
Armed Forces respectively to the level of national threats and the economic capabilities 
of the country.  It is worth mentioning the sensitivity of the Ukrainian Minister of 
Defense regarding this question, that  
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…[JDA] won’t be directed on bare military weapons and equipment 
inventory, but on the analysis of armed forces structure, operational 
principles, compatibility level with NATO alliance-members.48 
The Ukrainian Defense Minister’s anxiety can be easily explained by the question 
of long-standing negotiations between the two countries about the Classified Information 
Exchange Agreement.  The Ukrainian position concluded that such a paper may 
significantly advance both military organization’s relations in areas of defense 
structuring, operational activity and future membership in NATO.  
The creation of the Joint Ukrainian – U.S. defense policy and budgeting experts 
group based on existing cooperation, from the author’s standpoint, could serve to further 
promote the principles of transparency and proficiency in democratic approaches to 
utilizing defense policy and budgeting patterns.  That group might possess all the abilities 
to interact with the NATO defense analysis mechanism and newly created government 
commission for defense reform.  
B. ENSURING DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES 
Establishing democratic control over the armed forces in Ukraine as the Post-
Soviet republic is a complex if not unsolvable problem.  The difficulty may be partly 
explained by the insufficient development, or even absence, of all five main arenas of a 
consolidated democracy mentioned previously.  The deficiency of these structural 
elements may produce misperceptions typical for a society in a transitional stage,  
…Civilian control has been a Western orthodoxy reflecting three classic 
Western preoccupations: keeping the military out of politics, keeping the 
military out of power and subordinating military values to civilian ones.49  
As mentioned previously, the Soviet example has proved that the regime was 
mostly, 
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…Militarized, but it was not militaristic… armed forces had to be the tool 
of policy, rather than the master.  In this respect fortunately – if even in 
several other respects sadly – the system of officer education has not 
changed in Ukraine.50 
Initially, the western value and term “democratic control” is misunderstood in 
Ukrainian military and civilian circles.  The misunderstanding primarily concentrates on 
two main reasons: linguistic associative definition and misunderstanding of the core 
significance of democratic civil-military relations.  The meaning of the term “control” is 
mostly associated with the words “…’direction’… or ‘supervision’”. However, “…at 
most it corresponds to ‘oversight’.”51  The next reason for such misperceptions mainly 
focuses on the fact that the question of democratic control over the military is 
substantially resolved with civilian institutions, and the means for military subordination 
to civilian authorities.  Although, in reality, the question is far from a positive solution.  
The concept of civilian control over military personnel is only one element of the greater 
topic of democratic control over military or democratic civil-military relations while 
others remained practically untouched. 
Ukrainian political and military environment misperceptions of the question on 
democratic civil-military relations are mainly caused by the scant influence of western 
political and academic communities on the formation of the Ukrainian’s view and 
representation of such relations.  Possessing a large quantity of theoretical and case 
materials on civil-military relations, including the Eastern problem, the West’s 
connection with existing civilian and military exchange programs in Ukraine does not 
produce desirable outcomes.      
As a result, the democratic notions of civil-military relations have not been fully 
implemented in Ukraine’s political and military hierarchy during the last decade.  The 
Byzantine style of military utilization of any executive power, and not the institutional 
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style, still prevails as an appropriate method of civil-military interactions.  These relations 
are the logical outcome of a weak or undeveloped civil society in the country:  
To this day, most ordinary people in Ukraine do not start with 
Enlightenment assumption that “man is the architect of his fortunes.”… 
they no more expect to exercise control over the state then they expect to 
control the weather, and then expect “them”, the vlada (“powers”) to act 
according to their own rules and purely in their own interests.52    
The concept of a Ukrainian “civil society” is a cornerstone of creating democratic 
civil-military relations.  The realization of civilian control over the military should be 
implemented by developing the five main elements of consolidated democracy in 
Ukraine.  The notion that the people are “masters” of their armed forces must be a 
prevalent concept in the education of civilian and military professionals.  Of course, such 
an idea presumes clear legal and constitutional frameworks with the goal of ensuring 
democratic control over the military.  
The role of Ukrainian – U.S. military relations in that question cannot be 
immediate but only gradual.  To achieve the efficacy of ensuring democratic control over 
the military from the bilateral relation standpoint is a matter of time and well-coordinated 
actions in all elements of education and implementation of the core democratic civil-
military values, beginning with military educational programs, developing joint 
strategies, and supporting and establishing a democratic civil-military environment in the 
country.  
C. CLEAR LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 
From the moment independence was obtained in 1991 until 2001, the Ukrainian 
parliament has progressed quite a bit in establishing a legal and constitutional base.  The 
laws that fall under military activities, and which have become a legal framework shaping 
civil-military relations in Ukraine are: 
• The Constitution of Ukraine (1996) 
• The Law of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (1993) 
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• 1993 Military Doctrine (attempt to renew it in 2001) 
• State Program on Armed Forces Reform and Development 2001 – 2005 
• National Security Concept (1997) 
It is difficult to assert whether those laws fully correspond to the realm of 
democratic civil-military relations.  As is more apparent, by observing the workability of 
those laws, the mechanisms for their implementation and execution have received a great 
deal of criticism.  Defiance of the laws by powerful personalities or institutions that do 
not have the authority to make do so, still persists in Ukraine.  That situation is obviously 
ingrained in the concept of the state functioning in accordance with legal frameworks and 
in the question of corporate judicial discipline.  Without proper education and the 
unquestionable observance of norms and principles reflected in laws, the existence and 
the continuance of democratic civil-military relations is hardly achievable.      
The other significant difficulty in pursuing democratic principles in civil-military 
relations lies in the area of a law’s functional and structural coherence: 
The growing coherence and density of the legal framework in Ukraine 
defense sphere – a world apart from the incoherence that still prevails in 
spheres such as finance, export licensing, and taxation – limit arbitrary 
actions and strengthen the risk that such actions will be exposed and 
censured.  They are a precondition for lawful, accountable conduct, even if 
they do not guarantee it.53    
Ukrainian law concerning its armed forces clearly outlines the areas of 
responsibility between the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff.  Observations from 
last year indicate inefficiency in the implementation these key law components.  The area 
of responsibility between those structural defense institutions, once indicated in the law 
of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, in practice is vague about separating functional 
responsibilities.  The explanation for that phenomenon varies from positional conflicts of 
the defense establishment, the lack of civilian professionals able to handle and work with 
defense aspects and possessing civilian expertise, unwillingness of governmental bodies 
other than the Ministry of Defense to deal with defense problems, to the low threat level 
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to the military dimension of Ukrainian national security that leads to the misperception of 
the country’s safeness.  
The Ukrainian Supreme Council, a key player in creating the armed forces during 
the Ukrainian years of independence, has substantially downsized its legal influence 
concerning the process of the budgeting accountability of the Ministry of Defense once 
the budget is approved by the Parliament.  According to Heorhy Kriuchkov, recently the 
chief of the parliamentarian committee on national security and defense issues:  
 …The Parliament of Ukraine is deprived of legal grounds to influence 
personnel policy on the military sector, which reduces the effectiveness of 
control.  Parliamentary committees are not empowered with any 
supervisory functions.  Although, they scrutinize implementation of 
specific laws, formally, this is not in line with the norms of the 
Constitution.54  
From these particular examples, the role of Ukrainian – U.S. military relations 
appears to be important in order influence and help the process of civil-military 
lawmaking and law correction.  Recent military cooperation does not need to be directed 
only at purely military aspects but needs to be able to create mechanisms that allow 
Ukrainian and American civilian and military legal experts to exchange and participate in 
a variety of case events covering the process of civil-military legal interactions.  The 
Ukrainians and Americans already have in their military programs a direction that 
enhances the legal development of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  It will be beneficial to 
extend that program also to civil-military relations, including Ukrainian civil legal 
specialists.  
The gradual transition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces has resulted in progress at 
the instigation of the Ukrainian Supreme Council  
The ‘Law of Ukraine on Civilian Control over the Military organizations 
and Law enforcement activities in Ukraine.’  The law encapsulates the 
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1994 ‘OSCE Code of Conduct Regarding Political Military Aspects of 
Security,’ to which Ukraine is signatory.55  
D. CHAIN OF COMMAND FROM GOVERNMENT TO MILITARY 
THROUGH A CIVILIAN MINISTER OF DEFENSE 
Recently, as well as during the last decade, the question of having a civilian 
defense minister was too controversial for Ukrainian political and military circles.  More 
then decade of Ukrainian independence has not eased the question of the acceptance of a 
civilian high-top official in the corridors of military power.  The failed attempt at having 
Valeriy Shmarov (1994 – 1996) be the first civilian Minister of Defense has highlighted 
some provisions.  Shmarov’s appearance on the Ukrainian scene as a Defense Minister 
had resulted in his being generally negatively received in the Ukrainian high military 
defense establishment: 
…The overly ambitious Valery Shmarov… had a point when declaring 
that “The generals are people who have to carry out orders from above. 
And so they think this way today and will think and act differently 
tomorrow.”…  who was decidedly an “outsider,” never to be trusted… 
Valery Shmarov could not do [National Program of the Construction and 
Development of the Armed Forces] and for which he was increasingly 
often attacked verbally for nearly two years…  which had been lost in the 
Defense Ministry and General Staff bureaucratic labyrinth …56 
Such attitudes toward Shmarov may be explained by his lack of military 
expertise, especially concerning the area of civil-military relations.  He was alone as a 
top-ranking civilian in the Ministry of Defense who did not possess a clear conceptual 
framework on how to handle a military environment.  Military legacy, both human and 
material remained after the Soviet Union dissolved and somehow helped him to manage 
the situation, but the Armed Forces needed serious structural and functional changes.  
The Civilian Ministry of Defense – General Staff correlation of forces was not properly 
executed with Shmarov in the center of purely military activities.  However, it was not 
his responsibility to properly adjust interactions of the Ministry of Defense – Parliament 
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– Cabinet of Ministers in questions dealing with the military budget.  Analyzing the 
military Ministers of Defense following Shmarov, the same inability to manage military 
financing questions can be traced easily.  It is not possible even for a civilian Minister of 
Defense to deal with the questions of military – civilian institution interactions when the 
entire system needs to be adjusted.  However, it was Shmarov who initiated Ukraine’s 
membership in the ‘Partnership-for-Peace’ program by saying that: “Ukraine's aspirations 
are not only to become integrated into the world's economic community, but also to 
establish interaction in the military sphere.”57  
After President Kuchma had replaced Valery Shmarov with a military person, he 
explained to the democratic Europe, “We will decide on appointing a civilian as Defense 
Minister when our Armed Forces are firmly put on their feet.”58  However, the questions 
relating to democratic control over civil-military relations are raised by every NATO 
delegation visiting Ukraine.  For Ukrainian – U.S. military relations, the visible goal is to 
continue its efforts in creating a professional civil and military service in Ukraine.  The 
IMET program, as well as bilateral conferences and seminars covering questions of civil-
military relations, combined with the mechanism of implementing principles and 
employing people who possess knowledge in the area of civil – military relations, can 
serve as a viable element for furthering the development of effective civil-military 
relations with democratic norms and principles.  Otherwise, it does not seem possible that 
a fully workable civilian Minister of Defense in Ukraine will occur without changing 
such principles, as James Sherr argues:  
…Yet Ukraine does not possess a professional civil service, a corps of 
administrators whose political neutrality is unquestioned and who are 
competent and expert enough to execute government policy…  Do the 
armed forces resent civilian control, or do they resent being controlled by 
those who are less professional than they are?  Whatever the answer to this 
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question, the armed forces are probably correct that the time has not yet 
arrived for a civilian minister of defense in Ukraine.59      
Putting that argument candidly, the question whether Ukraine is able to fully 
participate in European economic and transatlantic security organizations with the current 
state of affairs remains unchallenged.    
E. QUALIFIED CIVILIANS WORKING WITH THE MILITARY ON 
DEFENSE POLICY, REQUIREMENTS, AND BUDGET 
This question has much in common with the aforementioned element of 
professional civilian control over the military.  Why are civil-military interactions in 
defense policy, military requirements and budget so essential to finding an appropriate 
place in the system of democratic values?  To begin with, democratic control presumes a 
full military accountability to their civilian taxpayers.  As Valeriy Muntiyan mentioned, 
the defense is  
…a specific product, which people buy from government… Therefore, 
defense expenditures – one of the main ‘common values”, which 
continuously competes with social expenses for its portion in state’s 
budget.60   
There are two sides to developing such a notion in Ukraine.  First, the idea of full 
accountability of military expenditures not only when the budget is created, but also 
when it is executed.  Unfortunately, that position, as of yet, still is not strongly supported.  
Although, many promising remarks have been made, even now it is surprising that the 
process is still not accepted in the Ministry of Defense – Parliament – Cabinet of 
Ministers interaction logic.  The transparency in the area of military budget supervision 
would have helped with the questions of fulfilling the budget.  Military unwillingness or 
ignorance in reflecting the information about budget expenditures publicly, on the one 
hand, and civilian incompetence or passiveness, on the other, prevents the processes of 
reforming the Armed Forces and transitioning to democratic control.         
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Second, the defense policy cannot be clearly formulated without common civil – 
military initiative and organization.  The defense policy is not necessarily reflected only 
in the National Security Concept, which was produced by the National Security and 
Defense Council, but also includes the questions about social guarantees to military 
personnel, development of military infrastructure and future military perspectives.  It 
should at all times have an executive feedback in order to achieve progress in military 
efficacy and effectiveness.  
Ukraine lacks qualified civilians who will be able to effectively work with 
military institutions as well as militaries that know and understand the necessity of well-
balanced and well-coordinated civil-military teamwork.  Substantial Ukrainian – U.S. 
military relations influence in this area is only unfortunately just beginning.  However, it 
is the important part in the development of domestic and NATO involvement concerning 
qualified civilians working with the military on defense policy, requirements, and the 
budget. 
F. EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT AND REVIEW BY PARLIAMENT 
With the goal of effectively achieving parliamentarian oversight over military 
bodies, except for the aforementioned principles, the Ukrainian Parliament’s primary 
need is to achieve consolidation in the implementation process.  According to the 
Ukrainian Minister of Defense, General Vladimir Shkidchenko: 
[Civilian]  Control must include also the responsibility of the bodies that 
control.  Where is parliamentarian control when for the past 8 months the 
Armed forces received 63.2 mil Hrv. [about $12 mil.] less?  Why is the 
Parliament going to examine 2002 budget’s execution only in 2003, when 
it is impossible to change anything?  We can go even further.  According 
to the Ukrainian Defense Law – 3% from GDP is assigned to the defense 
needs; however this law is not fulfilled. Again, where is parliamentarian 
control?  It is necessary either to edit this law or to ask about its non-
fulfillment…  The real statesmen also have to take the responsibility for 
the Armed Forces recent state of affairs.61   
These observations uncover parliamentarian – Ministry of Defense interaction 
difficulties because of the weakly-developed level of analysis that is inadequate without 
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possessing joint professional civilian-military expertise.  Thus, Ukrainian – U.S. military 
relations can reliably affect and influence the development of an efficient mechanism of 
parliamentarian control over military sphere such as: 
• The development of mechanism for military budget priority articles  
• The development of budget articles from audit and functional points of 
view 
• Sufficient control over military budget expenditures 
• The questions of the need to create intelligence and issues in the area of 
military science and technology oversight committees to develop 
sufficient analytical and information coverage.62 
G. CONCLUSION 
The current transformation of democratic civil-military relations in Ukraine is 
supported more by the military than by civilian authorities. Explanations are easy to 
identify. Since the first days of Ukrainian independence, the military has taken an active 
role in most of the world’s democratic security mechanisms: the Partnership for Peace 
Program, the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, the Black Sea Security Forces 
and the Rapid Reaction Forces.  All these initiatives have shown that the military is doing 
better in terms of fostering democratic-civilian institutions.  The majority of such 
initiatives in their framework documents envision the development of democratic civil-
military relations in a participant country.  Most civilian political and economic 
initiatives have recently gone awry, such as Ukraine membership in the WTO and EU.      
It is also true that the current situation in Ukrainian – U.S. military relations needs 
to be seriously reassessed.  The indicators are mutual dissatisfaction with the results of 
cooperation that sometimes lead to harsh critics – “For any strategy to succeed, it must be 
implemented using all instruments of U.S. power – and Ukraine must respond across the 
entire spectrum of its government.”63  
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The author is not sure whether the aforementioned semi-punitive actions, if 
proposed by the U.S. toward its engagement in Ukraine, would bring the desirable 
results.  Nobody likes to be a puppet in the hands of a more powerful actor.  Liberal 
pressure does not always vindicate the promotion of democratic values.  More apparently, 
the “more thoughtful organization” will look more encouraging for both Ukrainians and 
Americans as a result of the bilateral relations experience gained during the past decade 
than using power constituents.  There is no doubt that in the future such cohesive actions 
will gain not only a diplomatic appreciation but also the full support of the people.  It 
sounds trustworthy and cogently that: 
Ukraine, of course, must do its part.  In particular our efforts to assist 
Ukraine in its desire to move closer to transatlantic community will not 
succeed if its government is unable or unwilling to implement needed 
defense reforms and, more broadly, vital economic and political reforms to 
free up markets and combat corruption.64 
Therefore, the question of developing and deepening civil-military relations in 
Ukraine become a substantial point of the Ukraine’s ability to obtain full-membership in 
NATO, and in the foreseeable future, to enjoy the economic and social freedom benefits 
of the European community.  Ukrainian – U.S. military relations should become a 
substantial mechanism for shaping and implementing such relations.  Ukraine is a part of 
democratic Europe and its place within political, economical and military European 
organizations is essential not only for Ukraine, but also for all European countries.  
The Ukrainian notion of civil-military relations is different from those of Latin 
America and Western countries.  The years of independence have resulted in significant 
progress in the transition of the Armed Forces to a democratic institution in Ukraine by 
removing them from the civil part of society.  Such phenomena can be explained by 
insufficient attention paid to the domestic and international community concerning the 
question of developing democratic civil-military relations in Ukrainian civil society and 
with civil authorities.  As a result, “the state of civil-military relations in Ukraine cannot 
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be defined as sufficient, because of the one main principle – civil responsibility for the 
level of the Armed Forces efficacy.”65  
Given all these points, the effect of Ukrainian – U.S. military relations may 
substantially alleviate the main issues in democratic civil-military relations facing 
Ukraine such as: 
• Facilitating transparency in national defense planning and budgeting 
processes 
• Defining more precisely the goals and objectives of Ukraine civilian and 
military bodies and a method for their proper interactions 
• Defining the level of responsibility between civilian and military 
executive and legislative mechanisms such as the Supreme Council, the 
Ministry of Defense, the General Staff and the Supreme Court 
• Helping in further building clear legal and constitutional frameworks 
• Promoting further education in the area of civil-military relations as the 
ensuing method to establish a chain of command from the military to the 
government through a civilian Minister of Defense and qualified civilians 
working with the military on defense policy, requirements and the budget 
• Working in the area of assuring effective oversight and review by 
parliament not only over budgeting issues but also through structural and 
functional control 
• Developing propositions able to facilitate and maintain, specific to 
Ukraine, the previously bungled prestige of military service and the high 
level of trust towards the military from the Ukrainian society 
• Involving the Ukrainian civil society in discussions and the decision-
making mechanism concerning a wide variety of military issues through 
the mass media 
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V. FUTURE OF UKRAINIAN – U.S. DEFENSE AND MILITARY 
RELATIONS 
The first decade of Ukrainian – U.S. relations in the defense sphere has shown the 
U.S.’s strong defense and military support of Ukraine.  Its possible future progress will 
completely depend on Ukraine’s ability to provide Western countries with significant 
incentives on military reforms.  The ability of the Ukrainian Armed Forces to respond to 
the country’s economic capabilities and changes in the world security environment by 
demonstrating its professional qualities that correspond to democratic principles and 
values will influence the level of U.S. future military engagement in Ukraine.  Despite 
recent difficulties in relations between the two countries at a high political level, the 
question of military relations and relations in the defense sphere continuously remains an 
active and further progressing element of bilateral relations.  
A. DEFENSE RELATIONS 
The question of Ukrainian military reform is especially important for the United 
States concerning Ukraine’s future commensurable position with the transatlantic 
security organization.  The development of democratic civil-military relations is one of 
the main elements of the reform.  For this reason, the Unites States Ambassador to 
Ukraine, Carlos Pascual, has observed that there is a need to continue further cooperation 
between Ukrainian and U.S. Armed Forces as well as between defense ministries.  He has 
also stressed the importance of further support of the democratic environment and strong 
civil society in Ukraine.66 
It is obvious that the United State will continue its support of Ukraine’s future 
membership in NATO.  Being significantly challenged by the deterioration of Ukraine – 
U.S. relations at a high level, the November 2002 NATO Prague Summit could not 
tangibly change the acceleration of Ukraine – NATO relations.  Despite serious doubts 
about Ukraine’s impending entry in NATO, European security considerations cannot 
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simply disregard the strategic importance of Ukraine.  The United States, in this case, 
will probably continue to support Ukraine.  
In its turn, Ukraine will continuously accept and assist U.S. initiatives in 
defense and military area to have U.S.’s strong lobby in NATO, the 
guaranty of Ukraine’s nuclear security and support of Ukrainian Armed 
Forces further transformation.  It might seem in the eyes of some 
Ukrainian and international politicians that Russia’s latest rapprochement 
with NATO could significantly diminish strategic and geo-strategic 
importance of Ukraine.  Following this logic Ukraine, therefore, might 
lose its strategic attractiveness to the United States.  In this case, Carlos 
Pascual and Stiven Pifer disprove the aforementioned suspicion relying on 
Ukraine’s consecutive movement in democratic and military reforms and 
its European integration.  
The long-term objectives of the United States and Ukraine for Ukraine 
coincide: a democratic, market-oriented, prosperous state founded on the 
rule of law and integrated with Europe.  For the United States, these goals 
are long standing, underpinned by strong bipartisan consensus.  To 
achieve these ends, keeping focused on long-term objectives and not 
allowing every twist and turn of Ukrainian domestic politics to drive U.S. 
policy is crucial.  Current events should not be ignored; rather, our 
capacity to address them will be stronger if they are integrated into a 
consistent long-term policy agenda.  For that reason, the United States will 
continue to engage Ukraine and support a reform agenda consistent with 
Ukraine’s integration with Europe.67   
The question of the Ukrainian Armed Forces further transparency and democratic 
control will lead Ukrainian – U.S. defense relations to improve in the area of defense 
reform and defense economics.  Future defense activities will be mainly concentrated on 
the Joint Consultative Economic Committee, which contemplates cooperation to assist 
the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine with self-sufficiency in dealing with economic 
adjustment procedures and the question of base closures.  Ukraine and the U.S. joint 
defense economy mechanism will continue adjusting its activities toward Ukraine’s 
further adoption of modern western defense management procedures.  Scarce future 
resources available to Ukraine will be decreasing even more, and therefore, will cause the 
country’s civilian and military leadership to be more efficient in its spending.   
                                                 
67 Carlos Pascual, Steven Pifer, “Ukraine’s Bid for a Decisive Place in History,” The Washington 
Quarterly, 25:1 pp. 175-192, Winter 2002. 
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While being the crucial aspect of civil-military relations, defense reform and 
defense economics will become the major constituent of Ukrainian – U.S. defense 
relations.  At the same time, other elements of civil-military relations are problematic for 
Ukraine, such as the institution of a civilian Minister of Defense and qualified civilians 
working with the military on defense policy, requirements and the budget.  Effective 
oversight and review by parliament all of these factors will obviously result in the U.S.’s 
further emphasis on shaping the future strategy of bilateral defense relations.  With these 
and other questions that pose problems in the area of Ukrainian civil-military relations, 
IMET-sponsoring events will continue their activities in the European Marshall Center 
for Security Studies and the Monterey Center for Civil-Military Relations. 
More civilian involvement in the matters of military and defense policy is 
necessary to overcome that ambiguity in Ukraine’s strategic orientation…  
The problem is not so much the number of civilians working for the 
Ministry of Defense… the problem is to reshape these institutions 
according to civilian norms of governance, transparency and 
accountability.  The level of society involvement could be increased if 
more broad-based nongovernmental organizations showed persistent 
interest in the matter of security and defense.68   
Such a U.S. position at the executive level may be well correlated with the 
Ukrainian-American Bilateral Relations Office, previously known as the Ukrainian – 
American Military Liaison Team that has been operating in Ukraine since March 1999.  
Making its separate from NATO efforts, the U.S. is able to continue or enhance the main 
elements of its bilateral defense and military relations to maintain its own economic and 
security macro-consideration in Europe.    
At the same time, the U.S.’s recent National Security Strategy is directed towards 
the further strengthening of U.S. security cooperation with the NATO alliance.  The 
events of September 11th have resulted in the focus of national strategy being shifted 
toward the creation of the so-called Rapid Reaction Forces.  The impact on Ukrainian – 
U.S. defense and military relations, for the short term, is the active support of the U.S. in 
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the development of the Ukrainian Rapid Reaction Forces, relying on Ukraine’s future 
NATO membership, and therefore, will concentrate the lion’s share of its financial and 
military support toward the Ukrainian Armed Forces.  
…NATO must develop new structures and capabilities to carry out that 
mission under new circumstances.  NATO must build a capability to field, 
at short notice, highly mobile, specially trained forces whenever they are 
needed to respond to a threat against any member of the alliance.69    
However, the U.S.’s future position toward Ukraine is seen as being 
overshadowed by the U.S.’s hope to alleviate Russia’s NATO aspirations only at the 
expense of being actively involved in the former Soviet Union countries.    
We will continue to bolster the independence and stability of the states of 
the former Soviet Union in the belief that a prosperous and stable 
neighborhood will reinforce Russia’s growing commitment to integration 
into the Euro-Atlantic community.70  
It is hopeful that the statement of the aforementioned Carlos Pascual and Stiven 
Pifer does not contradict U.S. National Security aspirations.  
Recent observations indicate that the Ukraine – NATO partnership will remain an 
important element for shaping Ukrainian and American cooperation in the defense 
sphere.  The questions of Ukrainian military reform and civil-military relations further 
development discussed at the Bilateral Working Group session are similar to those stated 
by the NATO – Ukrainian Action Plan signed on November 2002 Summit in Prague.  
Ukraine remains committed to carrying forward its defense and security 
sector reforms, with the aim of restructuring and reorganizing its national 
defense and security establishment into a democratically controlled and 
effective organization able to ensure its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity and to contribute to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
In taking forward these defense and security sector reforms, Ukraine seeks 
to adapt its structures and missions to the changing nature of security risks 
in the Euro-Atlantic area, to shift from the principle of “territorial circular 
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defense of the country, and to build on the need to support both the 
military and non-military aspects of crisis management…  
Ukraine will seek to complement its defense reforms with programs to 
address the consequences and problems of defense reform, such as 
assistance programmes for retired and redundant personnel, base closures, 
safe disposal of obsolete and surplus munitions and military equipment, 
conversion of defense industries, and cleaning up environmental 
degradation.71 
Being linked with NATO’s basic principles, the bilateral relations of both 
countries in the defense sphere will also continue to develop in their own way.  The 
possible scenario of the U.S.’s estrangement from NATO is not excluded.  Recent 
political quarrels between the United States and Germany and France concerning actions 
toward Iraq indicate that U.S. individual security interests sometime conflict with those 
of its European alliances.  The U.S. position to act unilaterally toward Iraq in the case of 
major discords possibly implies that despite its NATO’s kinship, the question of 
maintaining its own security interests from time to time may take a separate and different 
path.  Ukrainian – U.S. defense relations thus will continue to play its dual game of 
Ukraine’s accession to NATO, and at the same time, seek or build a bilateral defense 
cooperation environment.  
 Whatever is happened, the Pentagon’s international role will obviously remain 
directed both on alliances and individual relationships, making explicit and predictable 
the U.S. security policy abroad: 
The U.S. Defense Department must manage far broader roles and far more 
complex international for the U.S. military than ever before. Both demand 
innovative leadership, imaginative policies, and inventive organization… 
To ensure effective coalition capabilities in the future, the Pentagon must 
develop a coherent and sustainable plan for connecting America’s likely 
partners to the U.S. military information architecture in the future. To 
enhance overall international capacity but reduce the U.S. burden in 
conducting peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, DOD must 
strengthen other participants and at the same time cooperate more 
efficiently with them. To fulfill the ambitious goals of the ‘shaping’ 
mission, it must pursue innovative military-to-military cooperation 
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programs that advance U.S. national security goals and are fully integrated 
into the defense resource allocation process. Taken together, these 
recommendations comprise a blueprint for managing critical aspects of the 
Pentagon’s global ties in the first decade of the new century.72     
B. MILITARY RELATIONS AND RELATIONS IN THE AREA OF 
MILITARY SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 
The area of military relations will be supportive to the overall goals and 
objectives of joint programs in the defense and military sphere.  The practical constituent 
of the relations will obviously supplement the NATO – Ukraine Action Plan.  
In the context of both defense reform and adapting to new security threats, 
NATO Ukraine cooperation in the area of defense reform, defense related 
areas and military cooperation are essential.  
Cooperation with NATO in the military sphere is regarded as an important 
element of the overall NATO-Ukraine partnership.  Military cooperation 
translates military aspects of overall political goals and planning targets 
into military cooperation activities for their implementation.73  
Ukraine will remain responsive to the commitment of the Ukrainian – American 
Military-to-Military Contacts Program.  The particular direction of the program, such as 
military medicinal exchange visits, bilateral and multilateral military exercises, legal 
experts exchange visits, and English language preparation and participation in the IMET 
program will result in the most comprehensive development.  Bilateral efforts will also 
cover the question of U.S. continued support for developing closer NATO - Ukraine 
relationships, which will concentrate on training, seminars and staff officer courses, and 
further cooperation in developing the Yavoriv Partnership for Peace Training Center in 
Ukraine. 
The sphere of trilateral Ukraine – U.S. – Poland military cooperation proposed by 
the U.S. will secure its practical fulfillment.  The development of trilateral cooperation 
will be especially encouraged by Poland, when taking into account Poland’s interest in 
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supporting Ukraine’s future membership in NATO as its neighboring country, and close 
economic and political ties.  
Concerning the professionalisation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the bilateral 
success achieved in creating the Army and Air Force NCO Academies will continue 
efforts in supporting Ukraine’s all-volunteer force and the creation of a professional NCO 
corps. 
The most tangible problem will appear in Ukrainian-American relations in 
spheres of military science and technology.  The big differences in military-industrial 
complex economic approaches and high level of competition in the world’s weapons 
market clouds the development of bilateral relations in this area.  Ukraine’s transitional 
economy looks unstable and unconnected to the European and American military 
industry.  The U.S.’s technical support to Ukraine within the framework of the Foreign 
Military Sales Program is limited in nature.  It will be impossible to sign the General 
Security of Military Information Agreement because of the existing ‘Kolchuga’ scandal.  
Finally, the question of the countries military-technical relations needs to be more 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military relations have been successful for Ukraine.  
Compared to other areas of bilateral relations between two countries, defense and 
military cooperation demonstrates the most sizeable achievements: 
• The creation and participation in the real spectrum of programs in defense 
and military areas that allow Ukraine to find its place within a European 
and Transatlantic security system 
• Ukrainian Armed Forces are undergoing a transformation to democratic 
civil-military relations and are adjusting to modern economic and combat 
requirements 
• Ukrainian – American relations influence the processes of Ukraine’s 
economic and societal renovation 
The thesis argues that the overall strategy of Ukraine and U.S. defense and 
military relations should be directed toward achieving the aforementioned goals.  In 
defense and military spheres Ukrainian goal is to protect the people of the country by 
providing adequate national security.  In a broader context, the idea of national security 
includes a wide range of economic, military and cultural activities, for example. 
Ukrainian and U.S. military cooperation is advanced.  This thesis demonstrates, 
however that military interoperability is still not contributing to overall strategic goals.  
Due to the absence of Ukrainian and well-defined U.S. goals in defense and military 
cooperation, the existing mechanisms of cooperation will continue to remain hardly 
receptive to the overall idea of the democratic transformation of Ukraine.  
What is currently available is a set of defense and military cooperation programs 
and mechanisms, which have achieved limited goals and objectives.  While the 
interoperability of the Ukrainian, American and European military units seem to be 
steadily progressing, the political-military environment has not changed.  Without 
appropriate action, the recently approved Ukrainian - NATO Action Plan may fall by the 
wayside.  
One of the weaknesses of modern Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military relations 
is that the U.S. Department of Defense is finding it difficult to discover an appropriate 
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counterpart in the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense.  This lack of an appropriate counterpart 
makes it difficult to implement the strategy outlined in the Ukrainian - NATO Action 
Plan and achieve positive outcomes.   
Meanwhile, the U.S. defense and military engagement programs towards Ukraine 
remain fragmented.  Ukrainian – U.S. defense and military cooperation needs 
comprehensive feedback mechanisms about individual events and after-action reports.   
The process and transformation of the Ukrainian Armed Forces toward 
democratic civilian-military requires several initiatives: 
• Find a way to adjust the goals and objectives of recent cooperation in the 
defense sphere to the democratic structure of the Armed Forces and its 
place within European and Transatlantic Security 
• Direct the main existing mechanisms (the U.S.-Ukraine Joint Staff Talks, 
the U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Working Group, and the Joint Economic 
Group) of bilateral relations in the defense sphere to a renewed hierarchy 
of goals and objectives 
• Revise the mechanisms and management of agencies that exist in the 
sphere of defense and military cooperation between Ukraine and the 
United States with the aim of performing mutual efforts, preventing 
deviations from the path towards democratic military reforms and 
transition processes of the Ukrainian Armed Forces  
These goals can make a real contribution to the overall strategic goals of defense 
and military cooperation.  Coupled with economic initiatives, the focus of democratic 
civil-military relations should be to ease the general climate of bilateral defense and 
military relations.  Without such actions, Ukraine’s European scenario as well as the 
Ukrainian – American strategic partnership officially declared by former Vice President 





APPENDIX A.  PLAN OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE 
MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OF UKRAINE AND THE DEPARTMENT 
OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA FOR 2003∗ 
Building on the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and 
Military Relations between the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the Department of 
Defense of the United States of America signed on 27 July 1993, the parties plan to make 
their best efforts to undertake the following defense and military cooperation activities in 
2003. 
A. Bilateral Meetings 
1. Meetings between the Ukrainian Minister of Defense and the U.S. Secretary of  
Defense / terms to be determined (TBD). 
2. US-Ukraine defense consultations meeting/TBD. 
3. US-Ukraine staff talks/ TBD.  
 
B. Defense Cooperation 
Cooperation between the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Defense is 
designed to meet National Defense Reform Objectives, Rapid Reaction Forces formation 
and mutually agreed goals in seven main focus areas, as reflected in the Joint Working 
Document on Ukraine-U.S. Defense Cooperation 
1. Potential Threats: 
- Activities pursuant to existing agreements between the parties concerning 
the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. 
- Mutually agreed activities related to NBC defense/counter proliferation. 
2. Military Interoperability: 
- Implementation of mutually agreed International Military Education and 
Training activities with emphasis on developing a broad-based English language 
program. 
- Mutually agreed Foreign Military Sales (FMS) activities entailing provision of 
defense articles and services. 
- Implementation, as agreed, of the Enhanced International Peacekeeping 
Capabilities Initiative through the FMS and Foreign Military Financing programs. 
- As appropriate and as mutually agreed, continued U.S. Department of Defense 
support for development of the Ukraine-NATO relationship, which may include: 
- Training, seminars, and staff officer courses; 
- Continued cooperation in developing Yavoriv as Partnership for Peace 
Training Center; 
- Trilateral military cooperation among the Ukraine, United States and Poland. 
                                                 
∗ The Courtesy of Department of International Cooperation Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.  
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3. Force Professionalization: 
- Scheduled activities related to the joint action plan for the Military Education 
Development Program to 2005. 
- Mutually agreed activities in support of Ukraine's efforts in the transition of Ukraine’s 
Armed Forces to a contract manning system, with a focus on establishing a personnel-recruiting 
system. 
- Continuation of cooperative activities to create a professional noncommissioned officer 
(NCO) corps. 
- Activities directed towards professionalization and development of Rapid Reaction 
Forces of Ukrainian Armed Forces. 
- Ukraine’s participation in the exercises in the spirit and in the framework of 
“Partnership for Peace” Program as a host nation/ participant.    
4.Civil-Military Relations: 
- Continuation of the appropriate seminars and courses, particularly those sponsored by 
the Marshall Center and the Monterey Center for Civil-Military Relations. 
- Mutually agreed activities associated with providing military support to civilian 
authorities in event of emergency situation and disaster relief, including the conduct of a Civil-
Military Emergencies Planning Seminar. 
5. Defense Structuring and Resourcing: 
- Activities related to the Joint Consultative Economic Committee, including 
cooperation to promote Ukrainian MOD self-sufficiency in dealing with economic 
adaptation of those service members and their family members who are subject to force 
reduction, and with the conversion of military installations. 
6. Defense Support Issues: 
- Scheduled activities related to the military medical cooperation program. 
- As mutually agreed, Department of Defense continued support for humanitarian 
assistance requests for non-military application, by mutual agreement. 
- Exchange of information concerning military ecological concerns and their impact on 
environmental security. 
7. Military Scientific and Technical Cooperation: 
- Conduct meetings of the Ukraine - U.S. Joint Committee to review the candidate 
technologies provided in the Master Information Exchange Agreement. 
- By mutual agreement, implement information exchanges on Military-Technical issues 
and examine potential venues for Military-Scientific cooperation. 
 
 
C. Military Cooperation 
 
Events related to the program of Ukrainian - U.S. military contacts for 
2003 as was not agreed yet by the Chief of the General Staff of Ukraine and the 
Commander, U.S. European Command. 
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In keeping with the Memorandum of Understanding cited in the introductory 
paragraph, both sides will strive to enhance current programs and broaden and deepen 
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APPENDIX B.  2003 U.S. - UKRAINE MILITARY CONTACTS 
PROGRAM∗ 
1.   Based on the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Defense and 
Military Relations between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and 
the Defense Ministry of Ukraine, signed on July 27, 1993, the Parties undertake to make 
their best efforts to conduct the following events, which are under the auspices of the 
Commander, United States European Command and the Chief of the General Staff of the 
Armed Forces of Ukraine, in the year 2003. 
 
2.   Events in this Program were developed using the U.S. - Ukrainian Joint 
Working Document on Bilateral Defense and Military Cooperation and are organized 
according to the Major Focus Areas of Defense and Military Cooperation between the U.S. 
Department of Defense and the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. 
 
3.   Joint Working Document Major Focus Areas: 
 
I.      Potential Threats: 
 
(A)   UP 429 NBC Terrorist Threat Response/WMD Nonproliferation TCT. 
(B)   UP 465 NBC Protection & Response TCT. 
 
II.      Military Interoperability: 
 
(A) Military Interoperability Events in conjunction with scheduled operations in   
         KFOR. 
(B) PEACE SHIELD 03* -ISO PfP Ground Forces Exercise (Ukraine hosts)   
         /summer. 
(C)   SEA BREEZE 03* -ISO PfP Naval Forces Exercise (Ukraine hosts) /summer. 
(D)  COMBINED ENDEAVOR 03* - ISO PfP Communications Exercise (Ukraine 
participates). 
* Each combined exercise includes four planning conferences: Concept 
Development Conference, Initial Planning Conference, Main Planning Conference, and 
Final Planning Conference, with additional coordination meetings as required. 
(E)   Commander in Chief, Ukrainian Ground Forces attend Conference of 
European Armies hosted by US Army Europe. 
(F)   Naval Passing Exercises (PASSEXES) - in conjunction with scheduled 6th 
Fleet Operations. 
(G)  Port Visits — in conjunction with scheduled 6th Fleet Operations. 
Naval Personnel Exchanges — in conjunction with scheduled 6th Fleet  
              Black Sea Operations. 
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(I) UP 464   Strategic Communications TCT. 
(J) UP 451   Air Defense Units in Peace Support Operations TCT. 
(K) UP 428   Airfield Requirements FAM. 
(L) UP 453   Meteorological Support to Combat Operations TCT. 
(M) UP 434   Air Force Maintenance Personnel Training FAM. 
(N) UP 435   Strategic-level Logistics FAM. 
(O) UP 454   Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL) Equipment TCT. 
(P) UP 469   Maritime Survival and Recovery Operations FAM. 
(Q) UP 440   Naval Search and Rescue TCT. 
(R) UP 441   Mechanized Unit in Multinational Peace Support Operations TCT. 
(S) UP 456   Airmobile Forces in Multinational Peace Support Operations TCT. 
(T) UP 470   Army Aviation Officer Exchange. 
(U) UP 442   Army Mechanized Infantry Officer Exchange. 
(V) UP 457   Airmobile Infantry Officer Exchange. 
(W) UP 474   Army Engineer Officer Exchange. 
 
III.  Force Professionalization: 
 
(A) UP 447   Computer Information Network for Recruiting Centers FAM 
(B) UP 448   Recruiting Station Shadow FAM. 
(C) UP 461   Recruiting Advertisement TCT. 
(D) UP 449   Army Transformation FAM. 
(E) UP 463   NCO Career Management TCT. 
(F) UP 466   Border Air Defense & Terrorist Countermeasures TCT. 
(G) UP 431   Explosive Ordnance Disposal & Demining Program TCT. 
(H) UP 446   Military Engineers Project Management TCT. 
(I) UP 445   U.S. Army Personnel Management Systems FAM. 
(J) UP 472   Training Program & Personnel Management Conference TCT. 
(K) UP 432   Military Police in Garrison TCT. 
(L) UP 459   Military Law Enforcement Computer Information Networks TCT. 
(M) UP 433   Military Police Unit FAM. 
(N) UP 452   Aviation Armament Operations & Storage FAM. 
(O) UP 443   Aviation Equipment Reliability TCT. 
(P) UP 439   Legal Service Shadow FAM. 
(Q) UP 468   Logistics Support TCT. 
(R) UP 426   NCO & Enlisted Artillery Training Programs TCT. 
 
IV. Civil-Military Relations: 
 
(A). Rough & Ready 2003* - California National Guard Combined Civil-
Military Operations Center Event (Ukraine Hosts)/ June. 
 * Includes 4 planning conferences and additional coordination meetings as required. 
(B) UP 438   Civil-Military Disaster Response Operations FAM. 
(C) UP 467   Civil-Military Legal Issues TCT. 
(D) UP 437   Public Affairs Training Program TCT. 
 76
(E) UP 455   Public Relations/Mass Media FAM. 
(F) UP 471   Out-of-Cycle Budgeting TCT. 
(G) UP 460   Military Topography TCT. 
 
V.       Defense Structuring and Resourcing: 
 
(A) UP 444   Ecological Support to Naval Operations TCT. 
(B) UP 458   Contaminated Territory and Environmental Monitoring TCT. 
(C) UP 436   Fuels Management TCT. 
 
VI.      Defense Support Issues: 
 
(A) UP 462   Military Base Closure TCT. 
(B) UP 450   Force Structure/Manpower TCT. 
(C) UP 473   Endoscopy FAM. 
(D) UP 430   Military Chaplain Training Program TCT. 
 
VII.    Events that include two or more JWD Focus Areas: 
 
(A) U.S.-Ukraine Bilateral Working Group/ Spring. 
(B) USEUCOM-Ukraine Consultative Talks. 
(C) U.S.-Ukraine Joint Staff Talks/ Fall. 
(D) CY 2004 Bilateral Cooperation Planning Conference (to be held in 
Ukraine). 
George C. Marshall Center Courses: 
(E) Leaders of the 21st Century Course (2). 
(F) Executive Course (3). 
(G) Senior Executive Seminar (2). 
(H) Foreign Area Officer Field Study. 
(I) Conference on Ukrainian Defense Reform (Garmisch, Germany) 
 
Additional contacts may be arranged through mutual agreement. 
In accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on 
Defense and Military Relations, both parties will strive to identify new areas of cooperation 
and the broadening and deepening of their relations. This program of military contacts will 
be forwarded to the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the 
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